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CBAPISa I
BIRTH OF AH IWTERHATtGHAL KiUTART TRIBUNAL
At « direct rttult of mto*8 atttapt to govern 
hiattlf in the international eoDununit/, and hit 
determination to puniah thoae who offended internation­
al legal and ethical atandardt, an inatrument «rat 
created» in the year 1945» to controveraial in nature 
at to become a major concern of international juriste• 
This instrument was the Nuremberg Tribunal constituted 
for the express purpose of prosecuting European Axis 
major war criminals whose crimes had no particular 
geographical location. The purpose of this study is to 
examine the legal foundations of the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal.
History reveals the existence of a body of laws» 
boro out of custom and convention, owing their existence 
and growth to a desire to ameliorate conditions in the 
conduct of warfare. Establishment of violations of 
these laws has ancient precedent, and war crimes trials 
have been conducted in previous centuries. But these 
may not be relied upon as setting exact precedents for 
the Nuremberg Court, for they were not war crimes trials 
in the international sense embraced by the Tribunal at 
Nuremberg. The trial of Sir Peter of Hagenback in 1474
-1-
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appear# to b* the first war crime trial on an inter­
national level* During the proceeding*, Sir Peter, 
governor of Brelsach under Charles of Burguoda/, was 
charged with having trespassed all bounds of decency 
and humanity in his treatment of the people under his 
rule* in alliance of independent cities and states 
captured Peter of Hagenb&ch and brought him before a 
tribunal consisting of judge* from the various states 
and cities forming the alliance* He was convicted and 
sentenced to^death for having disregarded the laws of 
Cod and man* This trial was carried on in accordance 
with judicial standards and may be considered as a 
forerunner of the Nuremberg trial*
The termination of World War I witnessed a formal 
attempt to create an international war crimes tribunal 
to punish enemy persons accused of having committed 
acts in violation of the laws and customs of warfare* 
An Allied commission was formed to inquire into and 
report upon violations of international law chargeable 
to Germany and her allies* It came to naught* As 
the American Professor Qlueck remarks, ** * , the 
malefactors not only went unwhipped of justice but 
were vociferously championed by strong elements of
IGeorg Schwarsenberger, International taw. 30$ 
(2nd Ed* 1950).
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SngXlab and A*#fic*a publie opinion." Kotwith* 
atanding tha fact that moat of the aceuaad want un- 
puniahad, it ia imparativa that tha Coamiaaion*a 
daXibarationa and racoanandationa ba axamlnad aa a 
point of dapartura for aimilar davalopæanta after tha 
Saoibd torld War.
Tha Preliminary Paaca Conference at tha plenary 
aaaaion of January 25» 1919» decided to create a 
eoamiaaion to inquire into tha raaponaibilitiaa for tha 
war. Tha Commiaaion compriaad fifteen mambara, two to 
ba named by each of tha Great Powara (United Stataa, 
Great Britain, Franca» Italy and Japan), and five to ba 
elected from among tha Powara with apacial intareata. 
Tha Commiaaion waa to inquire into and report upon the 
following pointai
1. Tha raaponaibility of tha author# of tha war.
2. Tha facta aa to braacbaa of tha law# and 
euatoma of war committed by tha forcaa of 
tha German Empire, and their Alliaa, on 
land, on tea, and in tha air during the 
present war.
3. Tha degree of responsibility for those 
offence# attaching to particular member# 
of the enemy forces, including members 
of tha General Staff, and other indivi­
duals, however, highly placed.
1-----
Sheldon Qlueck, Way Criminal#. 123 (1944).
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t. Tht constitution and procedure of # tribunal 
appropriate for the trial of these offence#.
5. Any other matter# cognate or ancillary to the 
above which may arise in the course of the 
inquiry» and which the Commiaaion finds it 
useful.and relevant to take into conaide* 
ation.J
The Commission presented its carefully prepared opinions 
to the Preliminary Peace Conference. On the question of 
the German responsibility for the war, the Commission 
considered these acts to be of such gravity that they 
should be formally condemned by the Conference; how­
ever, the acts which brought about the war should not
be charged against their authors or subjected to a 
4Tribunal.
I
Regarding breaches of the laws and customs of war 
and of humanity, the Commission members recognised that 
international law permits a belligerent to prosecute 
those accused of committing offences against the laws 
and customs of war, once the accused are within its 
power, and it may for that purpose set up its own 
courts and procedure. However, four categories of
— j— ,—
**Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors 
of the t’ar and on Enforcement of Penalties.* 14 Ameri-
cftei^A^^ L m  95 (mo), hereafter
120.
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charge» to th« ##mb#ro to demand proceeding*
In an international tribunal.
(a) Against persona belonging to enemy 
countries who have committed outrage* 
against a number of civilians and 
soldiers of several Allied nations, such 
as outrage* committed in prison camp* 
where prisoner* of war of several na­
tions were congregated or the crime of 
forced labor in mines where prisoners 
of more than one nationality were 
forced to work;
(b) Against persons of authority, belonging 
to enemy countries, whose orders were 
executed not only in one area or on 
one battle front, but whose orders 
affected the conduct of operation* against 
several of the Allied Armies;
(e) Against all authorities, civil or military, 
belonging to enemy countries, however high 
their position m f  have been, without 
distinction of rank, including the head* 
of states who ordered, or, with knowledge 
thereof and with power to intervene, 
abstained from preventing or taking 
measure* to prevent, putting an end to or 
repressing, violations of the law* or 
customs of war;
(d) Against such other persons belonging to 
enemy countries as, having regard to the 
character of the offence or the law of 
any belligerent country, it may be con­
sidered advisable not to proceed before 
a court other than the high tribunal 
hereafter referred to.)
The Commission proposed that the United State#, 
Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan each choose three
i W . ,  120W21.
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member# to tit on this Hlgb Tribunal» ani that Belgium»
Poland» Ceechoalovakia» Greece» Roumanie» Serbia and
Portugal each eelect one member for the Tribunal. The
law to be applied b/ thia Tribunal waa to embrace
principles of international law founded on the laws of
humanity and established usages of civilised nations.
If an accused person was found guilty by the Tribunal»
the High Tribunal was to have the power to sentence
him to such punishment as mi^t be imposed for such an
offence by any court in any country represented on the
6
Tribunal or in the country of the convicted person.
Significantly the Commission believed that those
responsible for violating the peace» however grave their
acts» should not be subjected to a tribunal becauset
• • • by reason of the purely optional character 
of the institutions at The Hague for the main­
tenance of peace • • • a war of aggression may 
not be considered as an act directly contrary 
to positive law, or one which can be successfully 
brought before a tribunal such as the Commission 
is authorised to consider under its terms of 
reference. Further» any inquiry into the author­
ship of the war muet» to be exhaustive» extend 
over events that have happened during many years 
in different European countries, and must raise 
many difficult and complex problems which might 
be more fitly investigated by historians and 
statesmen than by a tribunal appropriate to the 
trial of offenders against the laws and customs 
of war.7
122.
118.119.
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Thtiti According to the Gommleeloo, the Authors of the 
wsr, notebly the ex-Kslser, should not be brought 
before a tribunal. however# the Commission, debating 
the charge of violations of the ^aws of war, was of 
the opinion that an international tribunal could try 
such offenders, regardless of their position in the 
German government.
These recommendations of the Commission were not 
adopted. The American members of the Commission refused 
assent to the creation of an international criminal court 
for the trial of individuals, on the ground that pre- 
cedent was lacking in the practice of nations. They 
believed . . that an act could not be a crime in the 
legal sense of the word, unless it were made so by law, 
and that the commission of an act declared to be crime 
by law could not be punished unless the law prescribed 
the penalty to be inflicted.* The American members 
declared that they knew of no international statute or 
convention making a violation of the laws and customs of 
war an international crime, establishing a punishment for 
it or stating the court which had jurisdiction over the 
offense. The Americans "felt that the difficulty • • • 
was not insurmountable, inasmuch as the various states 
have declared certain acts violating the laws and customs
IW.
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of war to bo crlaoa» affixing puniabmont for thoir
oommlgaioQ# and providing military courts or commiaaion*
within the respective state# possessing jurisdiction
9over such offence." further, the Ünited States members 
opposed the doctrine of negative criminality which placed 
a criminal charge against individuals who failed to pre­
vent violations of the laws of war.
The Japanese delegates to U%e Commission raised the 
same basic question whether the law of nations recognised 
a penal law applicable to those who are guilty. It also 
seemed vital to them to . , consider the consequences 
which would be created in the history of international 
law by the prosecution for breaches of the laws and
customs of war of enemy heads of states before a tribunal10
constituted by the opposite party."
Thus the Allies, instead of accepting in full tbs 
recommendations of the Commission, inserted in the Treaty 
of Versailles certain "punitive Articles." By Article 
22$ the German government recognised the ri^t of tbs 
Allied and Associated Powers to bring before military 
tribunals persona accused of having committed acts in 
violation of the laws and customs of war. By the same 
Article, the German government was to hand over to one or
9
147.10
Ibid.. 152.
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«XI of th« Allied end A«soelated Power# «11 persona so 
«eeusedi specified by name «nd rank, office or employ­
ment which they held under Oermsn authorities. The 
guilty were to be sentenced to punishments prescribed 
by lew. Article 229 provided for the trial of the 
accused in military tribunals of the power against whose 
nationals the alleged crimes were committed. By Article 
230 the German government undertook to furnish «11 
documents and information which might be considered 
necessary for such proceedings.
Pursuant to Article 228, lists of accused persons 
were compiled by the principal Allied nations and pre­
sented to the German government on February 3, 1920.
Opon receipt of more than nine hundred names, the German 
government, though solemnly bound to respect the Peace 
Treaty, refused to surrender its war cris&inals. Approxi­
mately two weeks before presentation of the list of 
accused to Germany, the German governaent had proposed 
a compromise by which Germany would assume responsibility 
to prosecute the war criminals. The Allies, sensing the 
growing opposition to trials of German war criminals in 
Allied military courts, finally accepted the German 
suggestion, with the reservation that, if they were not 
satisfied with the conduct of the German court prosecuting 
the war criminals, the Allies would again exercise the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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right to try the «oeusod la their own military trihuaale*
la the place of the original list cootalning the
Blue hundred names presented to Germany, February 3,
1920, the Allies substituted aa abridged list to the
German Supreme Court at ielpslg containing only forty
five names of accused. Qlueck notess
But having so easily obtained a major concession 
from the Allies, the Germans mere not ready for 
trial even after receiving this abridged list.
They informed the Allies that difficulties were 
being experienced in obtaining evidence against 
the accused, because much of the necessary proof 
was in possession of the Allied Governments*
The Allies then arranged to assemble statement# 
of the proof against persons on the abridged 
list and transmit them to the . . .  public prosecutor 
in lelpflg. They prepared the evidence with com­
mendable care. Preliminary examinations were made 
in France and Belgium) depositions were taken la 
London) witbnesses were collected from across the 
seas and brought to Lelptig.ll
From the very beginning, however, the Lelptig Tribunal
bratenly flouted the seriousness of the task* Only
twelve of the forty five persons accused of war crimes
were actually tried b/ the Leipzig Court and but six
were convicted; their sentences ranged from six months
to four years imprisonment. The Allies were distressed,
and the French and Belgians particularly were indignant
over the Leipzig proceedings, A Commission of Allied
11
Qlueck, 422* 111## 27-2$.
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Juriati Ma» aet up in 1922, to inquira into tha conduct 
of tha Laipaig tflala. In ganaral, tha Coaadttaa waa 
diaaatiafiad with tha procaadinga of that Court* Tha 
mambara of tha Gomaittaa conclodad that it waa uaalaaa 
to allow tha Carman court to continua* Aa a rasult, 
tbaf raconmandad to tha Suprama Council of Xhû Allied 
and Aaaociatad Powara that no new oaaea ba aant to 
taipaig and that tha Carman government ba compelled to 
turn over aecuaad paraona for proaecution by tha Allies 
in pursuance of Article 228. "Thia," according to Oluak, 
"only resulted in great indignation in Germany • * * • 
Chauvinistic groups organised truculent protest meetings 
throughout Germany, at which high-ranking officers re­
minded the world that 250,000 national soldiers and tha 
police of tha Eaichswehr are in alliance to prevent tha12
handing over of Germans to tha justice of the Entente•*
In view of tha half-hearted attempts at justice by 
tha Court and tha apathy evident in soma Allied circles, 
notably American and British, tha German republic was 
able to affect an almost total acquittal for their war 
criminals. But despite dissatisfaction and tha failure 
to establish strong precedents, there can ba little 
doubt that tha intentions and opinions of tha Allied
12
m a . ,  }2.
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Commimm&oa er#*t#d # p*tt*ra which became m comer#too# 
la the structure of the more recent tribunal.
The Interim period between two major world con* 
filets la this century might perhaps have given birth to 
a body, eucb as an International tribunal, powerful 
enough to cope with future war criminals and war crimes 
trials. But this did not occur. True enough, a World 
Court existed, but it lacked jurisdiction to try 
criminal charges or to punish individual offenders. 
Moreover, no international code of criminal law was 
created during this period. Neither the Geneva Protocol 
of 1924 nor the Paris Pact of 192S, though designed to 
promote international conciliation, developed a code of 
international criminal law or an international tribunal.
Thus, as another war approached, the world still 
lacked some supra-national organ established for the 
punishment of persons violating principles in the law of 
nations. However, the incredible mass atrocities, havoc 
and destruction, and treaty violations which accompanied 
the more recent European holocaust aroused a great demand 
for punishment of those responsible for it. Many official 
protests were issued by the nations occupied by Germany 
for crimes committed by Germans on their soil. Crimea
13
See David 8. Killer, The Geneva Protocol. (1925); 
James T. Oerould, The fact of Paris, (1929).
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committed by the German# in Poland and CteehoslOTtkia 
were condoned by the British» French, Polish and 
Csechoslovak government# In 1940# A# General Taylor,
Chief of Counsel for Prosecution in the Nuremberg Tri­
bunal, notes, "President Franklin 0. Roosevelt publicly 
condemned the German practice of executing scores of 
innocent hostages in October 1941, and the British Govern­
ment indorsed President Roosevelt*# views in a declaration
14
by Mr# Churchill#* But it was not until 1942 that a
systematic program was developed to handle the problem
of enemy war criminals; A London conference of resent-
15ative# from nine European countries culminated la the
14
Telford Taylor, "Nuremberg Trials," 450 Inter* 
national Conciliation 244 (April 1949)#
Belgium, Cseehoslovakie, Free French National 
Committee, Greece, Norway, Poland, Tugoslavia, Luxen- 
bourg, and The Netherlands.
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dt« J#*## Declaration of January 13» 1942, It ia worth
I S T ~ ~
The text, me reported in The ??e» York Tiaeg, p* 6, 
eol. 1, Jan. 14, 1942s
Whereas Germany since the beginning of the present 
conflict, which arose out of her policy of aggres­
sion, has instituted in occupied countries a 
regime of terror characterised in particular by 
imprisonments, mass expulsions, execution of 
hostages, and massacres • • •
, . , And whereas, international solidarity is
necessary in order to avoid repression of these 
acts of violence simply by acts of vengeance on 
the part of the general public and in order to 
satisfy the sense of justice of the civilised world}
Recalling that international law and, in particular. 
The Bague in 1907 regarding laws and customs of 
land warfare do not permit belligerents in occupied 
countires to perpetrate acts of violence against 
civilians, to bring into disrepute laws in force 
,/ or to overthrow national .institutions}
The undersigned representatives of the Government 
of Belgium, the Government of Ciecho-Slovakia, 
the Free French Rational Committee, the Government 
of Greece, the Govemoent of Korway, the Government 
of Poland, the Government of Luxemburg, the Govern­
ment of the Retherlands, and the Government of 
• Yugoslaviat ■
1. Affirm that acts of violence thus perpetrated 
against civilian populations are at variance with 
accepted ideas concerning sets of war and political 
offenses as these are understood by civilised nations;
2# Take note of the declaration made in this respect 
on October 25, 1941, by the President of the United 
States of America and the British Prime Minister;
'3. Place among their principal war aims punishment 
through the channel of organised justice of those 
guilty and responsible for these crimes whether they 
have ordered them, perpetrated them or in any way 
participated in them;
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Botic# that the elgnetoriée were governmente in exile;
none of the major etatee were parties* This document
was a declaration of intention to punish those guilt/
of war crimes, at the termination of hostilities* The
Declaration, made public to the world, provoked an
enormous amount of criticism* While some believed that
summary punishment of the guilty would be the safest
and quickest method of attaining the goal, others saw
in the trials Allied desires for vengeance and fearful
17
consequences in future history*
One of the principal aims of Allied statesmen waa 
to try the offenders through the channels of organised 
justice, with the view that all the nations and their 
leaders would not soon forget these documented proceedings*
' 4* Determine in the spirit of international 
solidarity to see to it that those guilty and 
responsible, whatever their nationality, are 
sought for, handed over to justice and judged; 
that sentences pronounced are carried out*
17 ,See Montgomery Belgion, Victors* Justice. (1949); 
Quincy Wriaht, "The Law of the Nuremberg Trial," 41 
A*J*I*L. 3d (1947).
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Koreover, ther« if Ilttlf doubt that thia talk of 
puniahmeat waa planned by the Allies in order to 
encourage reaiatance to the German# and to demoralise 
them. It might be added howeTer, that the German leader#» 
sensing forthooaing puniahmeot» appear to have spurred 
German resistance to the bitter end.
As months passed, the determination of the Allies 
to punish criminals of tha European Isis increased. Onà 4
many occasions. Allied statesmen issued warning that
wrongs done would not go unpunished. Early in 1942, the
American Secretary of State declaredt
be are confident that before the end of another 
year the instigators of this war will have been 
given to understand how seriously they have under- 
stiaated the deteimination and the ability for 
effective action of the peace-loving nations and 
will have learned that in an aroused world aggressors 
can no longer escape the consequences of sets result­
ing in human suffering and destruction.Id
In May, 1942, the United States Assistant Secretary of
State, Mr, Berle, announced;
le
Department of State Bulletin 1761, gfflflmtUlS.tiDfla
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Th# individual Castapo agents, Bleek-Troopers, 
and others guilty of cruelty, robbery end 
oppression of civilians must be held to 
secouât* The names of many of these are already 
known to the United Kations* %ey will learn 
that none can break tha laws of civilisation 
with Impunity,19
On October 7, 1942, the President of the United States
isade his views public to the world:
On August 21 I said that this government was 
constantly receiving information concerning 
the barbstic crimes being committed by the 
enemy against civilian populations in occupied 
countries, particularly on the continent of 
Europe, 1 said it was the purpose of this 
government, as I knew it to be the purpose of 
the other United Nations, to see that when 
victory is won the perpetrators of these crimes 
shall answer for them before courts of law.
I BOW declare it to be the intention of this 
government that the successful close of the 
war shall include provisions for the surrender 
to the United Nations of war criminals, it is 
our intention that just and sure punishment shall 
be meted out to the ring-leaders responsible 
for the organised murder of thousands of 
innocent persons and the commission of atro­
cities which have violated every tenet of 
Christian faith*20
A few days later the United States and British 
governments announced their desire to join with other
19Dept, of State Bull. 1742. Cpmemor&tion ̂
Hisiua
2Î  ̂ *
Dept* of State Bull* 1824,Commission Jfea InvestWte War Crimes. 797 IOctober 10, 
1942 J*
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Allied iMitloQS to establish a *bnlt«d hâtions Commission
for the Investigation of War Crimes»* Seventeen nations
joined In eresting the Commission which met for the21
first time In October 1943» Russie desired to parti­
cipate, and urged that her sixteen Soviet Republics be 
represented Independently» This demand was opposed by 
the United States and Great Britain, and as a result 
the Soviet Union refused to participate» The Commission 
for the Investigation of War Crimes gathered and in-
• i
dexed charges submitted by member nations, and assembled 
lists of war crime suspects, but did not make investi­
gations or prepare prosecutions*
These Allied warnings and preparations of punishment 
did not deter the haeis, who continued their barbarous 
experiments at Dachau and Buchenwald» Other tldlees 
sprang up in various German occupied areas, notably the 
Greek village of Olstomo, and the unwarranted shooting 
of hostages, prisoners of war and civilians was not 
halted»
21Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Csechoalov«kia, 
France, Greece, India,. Luxemburg, the hetherlands, hew 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Couth Africa, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and Yugoslavia»
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»
Allied det#mination to punish the eneoy grew
la strength with the Moscow Conference* la # *0eela-
ration on German Atrocities," of October 50, 1945, the
United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet
Union jointly declaredt
At the time of the granting of any armistice 
to any government which may be set up In 
Germany, those German officers and men and 
members of the Katl party who have been 
responsible for, or have taken a consenting 
part in the above atrocities, massacres and 
executions, will be sent back to the countries 
in which their abominable deeds were done In 
order that they may be judged and punished 
according to the laws of these liberated 
countries and of the free govertusents which 
will be created therein. . * * The above 
declaration is without prejudice to the 
case of the major criminals, whose offences 
have no particular geographical locali*a&ion 
and who will be punished by the joint 
decision of the Goveraments of the Allies.**
A further and decisive step In the formulation of 
an International tribunal was taken only after victory 
in Surope. Pursuant to the Moscow Declaration, the 
United Kingdom, the United States, the French Republic, 
and the Soviet Union met at London, August 0, 1945, 
and signed an agreement of the establishment of an
 ^ -----
"Tripartite Conference In Moscow," 50 
(Supp) 7-0 (1944).
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international military tribunal* Tha London Agreement 
eryatalllsed the porpoae of the signatory national
Article 1
There «ball be established after consultation 
with the Control Council for Germany an Inter­
national Military Tribunal for the trial of 
war criminals whose offences have no parti­
cular geographical location whether they be 
accused Individually or In their capacity 
as members of organisations or groups or In 
both capacities.
Article 2
The constitution, jurisdiction and functions 
of the International Military Tribunal shall 
be those set out in the Charter annexed to 
this Agreement, which Charter shall form an 
Intagral part of this Agreement,
Article 3
Each of the signatories shall take the 
necessary steps to make available for the 
Investigation of the charges and trial the 
major war criminals detained by them who are 
to be tried by the International Military 
Tribunal, The signatories shall also use 
their best endeavours to make available for 
Investigation of the charges against and 
the trial before the International Military 
Tribunal such of the major war criminals as 
are not In the territories of any of the 
signatories.
Article 4
Nothing In this Agreement shall prejudice the 
provisions established by the Moacow Declaration 
concerning the return of war criminals to the 
countries where they committed their crimes.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Articl# 5
Any Govemmemt of th« Unltod Nation# may 
adbar# to thia Agreement by notice given 
through the diplomatic channel to the 
Government of the United Kingdom, who 
shall Inform the other signatory and 
adhering Governments of each such adherence.
Article 6
Nothing In this Agreement shall prejudice 
the jurisdiction or the powers of any 
national or occupation court established or 
to be established In any Allied territory 
or In Germany for the trial of war criminals.
Article 7
This Agreement shall come Into force on 
the day of signature and shall remain in force 
for the period of one year and shell continue 
thereafter, subject to the right of any sig­
natory to give, through the diplomatic channel, 
one month's notice of Intention to terminate It, 
Such termination shall not prejudice any pro­
ceedings already taken or any findings already 
m&de in pursuance to this Agreement. 23
The constitution, jurisdiction and functions of 
the International Military Tribunal are found in the 
Charter drawn up expressly for the Tribunal and appended
2)
C&nfepengg m  M l l m Z  ÎElâlî» 8. Department of atate Publication judO, international 
Organisation and Conference Series II, European and 
British Commonwealth 1, 420-421 (1949), hereafter cited
Bm a a  ü m m . s..
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to tb# London Agreement# According to the Cherter, 
the International Military Tribunal would have the 
power to try and punish major war criminals of the 
European Amis# The Charter specified that each of the 
four original signatories would designate a member and 
an alternate to the Tribunal# The members of the Tri­
bunal, before the beginning of trial, were to agree 
among themselves upon the selection of a President 
from their number, fiegarding jurisdiction, signatories 
declared in Charter Article 3, that "Neither the Tri­
bunal, its members nor their alternates can be
challenged by the prosecution, or by the Defendants or
24
their Counsel#” The Tribunal was not to concern it­
self with all individuals »Ao bad committed barbarities, 
no matter how grave or repulsive, nor with traitors, 
such as Laval, Quisling, or Lord "Haw Haw,” nor with 
individuals committing crimes in localised areas of a 
country formerly occupied by Germany, for such persons 
would come under the jurisdiction of the national courts 
where the sets were perpetrated# the Tribunal would 
prosecute only major war criminals of the European Axis, 
whose offences, as stated at Moscow, "have no particular
24International Conference S3l Kilitsry Trials. 422.
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(#ographlc#l loo&tlen»* #nd who*# crime# were part
of the Set! maeter plan of aggresalon# A# Justice
Jackaon, Chief Counsel for Prosecution on behalf of
the United States, declaredt
Our case against the major defendants is 
concerned with the Haei master plan, not 
with individual barbarities and perversions 
which occurred independently of any central 
plan# The groundwork of our case must be 
factually authentic and constitute a well 
documented history of what we are convinced 
was a grand, concerted pattern to commit 
the aggressions and barbarities which have 
shocked the world# 25
The Nuremberg Court was invested with power to try
and punish individuals guilty of having committed
the following crimest
Crimes Against the Peace; namely, planning, 
preparation. Initiation or wedging of a war 
of aggression, or a war in violation of 
international treaties, agreements or 
assurances, or participating in a common 
plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment 
of any of the foregoing;
War Crimea; namely, violations of the laws 
or customs of war# Such violations shall 
include, but not be limited to, murder, ill- 
treatment or deportation to slave labor or 
for any other purpose of civilian population 
of or in occupied territory, murder or 
ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons 
on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of 
public or private property, wanton destruction 
of cities, towns or villages, or devastation 
not justified by military necessity;
Crimes Against Humanity; namely, murder, 
extermination, enslavement, deportation, and 
other inhumane acts committed against
1 3 -------
International Confaranc* && Military IdSll. W.
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civilian population, befora or during th# war; 
or paraaoutloaa on political, racial, or 
rallgloua grounds In execution of or In 
connection with any crime within the juris­
diction of the Tribunal, whether or not In 
violation of the domestic law of the country 
where perpetrated. 26
With regard to the official position of the defendants, 
whether Reads of Stats or responsible officials In the 
German government, the Tribunal was not to consider 
them as outside Its jurisdiction, nor was their position 
to be considered as mitigating the punishment they were 
to receive. Selthtr could the Tribunal free from punish­
ment those defendants who acted pursuant to superior 
orders, though this might be considered In mitigation 
of punishment. This was demonstrated In practice during 
the Suremberg proceedings when the Tribunal stated that 
"The principle of International law, which under certain 
circumstances, protects the representatives of a State, 
cannot be applied to acts which are condemned as criminal 
by International law. The authors of these act# cannot 
shelter themselves behind their official position In
order to be freed from punishment in appropriate proceed- 
27logs.* Again In the view of the Court, *That a soldier
26
m  MUUafZ lH&la, 423.27
United States Chief of Counsel for the Prose­
cution of Axis Criminality, Kael Conspiracy and Aggressioni 
Opinion and Judgment. 53 tiwi, hereafter cited uplnloa 
âal jRtetai*
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ordered to kill or torture la YioXetioa of tb# 
International law of war hao never been recognised me 
a defense to such acts of brutality, though a# the 
Charter here provides, the order aay be urged in mitiga­
tion of the punishment. The true test, which is found 
in varying degrees in the criminal law of most nations,
is not the existence of the order, but whether moral
2Ô
choice was In fact possible." The determination of 
criminality on the part of some group or organisation, 
such as the Oestamo. also came within the realm of the 
Tribunal.
An examination of the Charter, concerning fair 
trial for the defendants, reveals the workable and 
sensible procedure to be used by the Tribunal. The Four 
member nations each had relatively distinct and highly 
developed judicial traditions. For Instance, criminal 
procedure in both the United States and Great Britain 
allows a defendant to testify subject to cross examination. 
This method Is quite unknown in the French and Russian 
systems. However, the stipulation that a defendant may 
give statements to a tribunal without taking an oath or 
subjecting himself to a cross-examination is employed 
by continental courts but is wholly alien to Anglo- 
American practice. Further, unlike Anglo-American
2d
Opinion and Judgment. )3-54.
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judical practlc#, Soviet practice relies on the
diligence of the court rather than the efforts of
29counsel to develop the facts In a case. Sensing the 
need to resolve these differences, the Four allies, after 
much discussion were able to achieve an amalgamation of 
the divergent practices. Article 24 of the Charter re­
conciled these divergent legal philosophies of the 
member nations In a workable procedure which sought to 
preserve the elements of reasonableness and fairness*
Article 24. The proceedings at the Trial 
shall take the following course*
• • . • (g) The Prosecution and the Defense 
shall interrogate and may cross-examine any 
witness and any defendant who gives testimony.
, . . . (j) Sack defendant may make a state­
ment to the Tribunal. 30
Article l6 of the Charter contained certain safeguards
of fairness In the hearings %
Article 16. In order to ensure fair trial 
for the Defendants, the following procedure 
shall be followed:
29Taylor, 258-259.
30
la U c ia ilfia a l m  m im a  Ir iâ la »  427-
428.
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(a) Th# Indictment shall l&clud# full 
particulars specifying in detail 
the charges against the Defendants.
A copy of the Indictment and of all 
the documents lodged with the 
Indictment, translated into a 
language which he understands, shall 
be furnished to the Defendant at a 
reasonable time before the Trial.
(b) During any preliminary examination 
or trial of a Defendant he shall have 
the right to give any explanation 
relevant to the charges made against 
him.
(c) A preliminary examination of a 
Defendant and his Trial shall be con­
ducted in, or translated into, a 
language which the Defendant understands.
(d) A defendant shall have the right to 
conduct his own defense before the Tri­
bunal or to have the assistance of Counsel.
(e) A defendant shall have the right through
' himself or through his Counsel to present
evidence at the Trial in support of his 
defense, and to cross-examine any witness 
called by the froseeution. 31
Articles 18 through 21 of the Charter for the Inter­
national military Tribunal stipulated that the Tribunal
3 1------  ,Ibid.. 426.
32
Ibid.. 426,
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was not to b« bound by technical rules of evidence*
la paeslas sentence, the Tribunal was to state 
reasons why it had found a defendant guilty or not
32
Ibid.. U27i
Article 18# The Tribunal shall
(a) Confine the Trial strictly to an expeditious 
bearing of the issues raised by the charges,
(b) take strict measures to prevent any action 
which will cause unreason&ole delay, and 
rule out irrelevant issues and statements 
of any kind whatsoever,
(c) deal summarily with any contumacy, impos­
ing appropriate punishment, including ex­
clusion of any Defendant or his Counsel 
from some or all further proceedings, but 
without prejudice to the determination of 
the charges*
Article 19. The Tribunal shall not be bound by 
technical rules of evidence. It shall adopt 
and apply to the greatest possible extent ex­
peditious and non-technical procedure, and shall 
admit any evidence which it deems to have 
probative value*
Article 20* The Tribunal may require to be in­
formed of the nature of any evidence before it 
is offered so that it may rule upon the re­
levance thereof*
Article 21* The Tribunal shall cot require 
proof of facts of common Knowledge but shall 
take judicial notice thereof* It shall also 
take judicial notice of official governmental 
documents and reports of the United hâtions, 
including the acts and documents of the com­
mittees set up in the various allied for the 
investigation of war crimes, and the records and 
findings of military or other Tribunals of any of 
the United Rations.
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guilty# Each judgment would be final and not subject 
to review. On conviction# imposition upon a defendant 
of the death penalty or any other punishment was iu 
the hands of the Court# Oentences were to be carried 
out in accordance with the orders of the Control Council 
for Germany, which had the power to reduce or otherwise 
alter the sentences, but not to increase their severity. 
If after the conviction of a defendant, the Control 
Council should find new evidence upon vdiich a fresh 
charge could be lodged against him, the Council was to 
report the matter to the Prosecution#
Thus, the Allies surmounted most vexing problems 
to create an intematio al leg&l tribunal for the trial 
of major war criminals. The trial opened on November 
20, 1945* and was faced with the prosecution of twenty- 
two defendants and six organisations# A day later, 
November 21, 1945» Justice Jackaon arose to present the 
opening statement in the case on behalf of the United 
States government. The American Justice conceded that 
the Tribunal, while novel and experimental, was not the 
product of abstract theorising# It was rather the 
result of a practical effort by four powerful nations 
and numerous lesser powers to utilise international law 
in cases where it had been violated. The significance 
of the Tribunal, for the United States representative.
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was that it would bring to justice those living 
symbols of terrorisa, racial hatreds, violence, and 
of arrogance and cruelty. To have filtered in creat­
ing such a court would have meant that civilization 
was compromising with those evil persons who renew 
their strength on the apathy and timidity of others.
Unfortunately, stated Jackson the nature 
of these crimes is such that both prosecution 
and judgment must be mde b/ victor nations 
over vanquished foes. The world-wide scope 
of the aggressions carried out by these men 
has left but few real neutrals. Either the 
victors must judge the vanquished or we must 
leave the defeated to judge themselves.
After the first World *ar, we learned the 
futility of the latter course. The former 
high station of these defendants, the 
notoriety of their acts, and the adaptability 
of their conduct to provoke retaliation make 
it hard to distinguish between the demand 
for a just and measured retribution, and the 
unthinking cry for vengeance which arises 
from the anguish of war. . . . %e must never 
forget that the record on which we judge 
these defendants today is the record on 
which history will judge us tomorrow. 33
Sir Hartley Shawcroas, United Kingdom prosecutor 
on the Nuremberg Tribunal saw the possibility of 
summary punishment for the defendants, but only a tri­
bunal could adjudge the guilt of those accused, according
33Robert R. Jackson, The Case Against the Nazi »-] 
Original:. 7 (19161.
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to law as wall as on moral or athlcal bases, kbile
natural justice demanded that the perpetrators of
war crimes be punished, it also demanded that no person
be punished unless a careful examination of the facts
demonstrated that he shared the guilt for what has
been done. The British representative declared*
• « • the effects of this trial will reach out 
far beyond the punishment of a score or so of 
guilty sen. Issues are at stake far greater 
than their fate, although upon their fate those 
issues, in some measure depend. In the pages 
of history it will count for nothing whether 
this trial lasted for two months or for ten.
But it will count for much that by just and 
patient examination the truth has been established 
about deeds so terrible that their mark may never 
be erased, and it will count for much that law 
and justice have been vindicated in the end, 34
In bis closing argument, Deputy Chief Prosecutor 
Dubost, for the French Republic, pointed out that the 
Court received facts which were submitted with the 
strictest objectivity, allowing no room for passion. 
Further, the Tribunal bad excluded from Jbbate anything 
that, in its view, appeared insufficiently demonstrated, 
anything that might have been motivated by reason of 
vengeance. For the French prosecution, the important
34
United States Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution 
of Axis Criminality, 1 Mil àâ&Esaalaa,(Supp A) 62 (1946), hereafter cited kari Conspiracy.
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element of the Nuremberg Trial was that of historical 
truth, future historians would have a documented 
record of the political, diplomatic, and military events 
during a most unfortunate period in history, and of the 
way in which Allied nations punished the men who were
35&uiity of many acts contrary to legal and moral codes.
tt« General Rudenko, representing the Soviet Union
as prosecutor remarked in his closing arguments
For the first time in the history of mankind, 
criminals against humanity are being held 
responsible for their crimes before an Inter­
national Criminal Tribunal. . . .  The present 
trial is being conducted in such a manner 
that the defendants who are accused of the 
most heinous crimes, are given all the 
possibilities for a defense, all the necessary 
legal guarantees. In their own country, the 
defendants who stood at the head to the 
Government, destroyed all legal forms of 
justice. . . .  They themselves are being 
tried by the International Court in accordance 
with all legal guarantees and they are assured 
of all their defense rights. 36
75
3
iUaoaalfâfix, 159. 
Hati ConsDirscY. 199, 200.
/
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CHAPTER II
STATÜ3 OP G&aKANI AT THi TSB%i*ATlvN Of WC*lLO WAH II
Before we can discuss the sources of jurisdiction 
of the International Military Tribunal, our attention 
should be directed toward a problem of paramount importances 
the statue of Germany at the end of World War II, The 
question, "who possessed sovereignty?" must be resolved 
since it is closely connected with bases of jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal. It is relevant because Germany did not 
consent to the establishment of a court for the trial of 
her subjects and thus a fundamental problem of international 
law, that of the necessity of consent, is raised,
Cn April 29, 1945, Lieutenant-General W, D, Morgan, 
Chief of Staff of Allied Force Headquarters, received 
the signature of two German plenipotentiaries, providing 
for cessation of hostilities and unconditional surrender 
of Kasi forces to the allied forces in Italy to be 
effective Kay 2, 1945. The instrument of surrender 
stipulated that "It is independent of, without prejudice 
to, and will be superseded by, any general instrument of 
surrender imposed by or on behalf of the United Mations 
and applicable to Germany and the German armed forces as
-33"
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a whol#.*
On 6 and 9, respectively, German representatives, 
for the balance of the German forces, signed further un* 
conditional surrender documents at Rheims and Berlin. 
Complete cessation of hostilities had now been achieved.
It is important to note that these last two documents 
of surrender had, like the first, stipulated that a 
general instrument of surrender imposed by or on behalf 
of the United Kations would follow and supersede them.
Twenty seven day# later these initial instruments
of surrender were supplanted by the promulgation of the
Declaration of Berlin, June 5, 1943. According to this
document the victorious powers assumed supreme authority
over the German territory:
The German armed forces on land, at sea and 
in the air have been completely defeated and 
have surrendered unconditionally. . . . There 
is no central Government or authority in 
Germany capable of acoepting responsibility 
for the maintenance of order, the administration 
of the country and compliance with the require* 
meats of the victorious Powers . . . .  The 
Government of the United Kingdom, the United 
States of America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, and the Provisional 
Government of the French Republic, hereby assume 
supreme authority with respect to Germany,
 1----------
"Unconditional Surrender of German and Italian 
Forces at Caaerta," 39 (Supp) 169 (1943).
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including all the power* possessed by the 
German Coremment» the High Cozm&nd end 
any state, municipal, or local government 
or authority* The assumption, for the 
purposes stated above, of the said 
autî ority and powers does not effect the 
annexation of Germany.2
This Declaration created unique and unprecedented 
situation In Germany, and many theories have since 
arisen as to the legal status of that country* Occupied 
Germany truly presents a legal dilemma, since it was 
conquered and its government was destroyed, but it wae 
not annexed* To find an acceptable legal approach to 
the status of Germany an inquiry u*t be made into 
the several divergent theories dealing with the matter.
Occupation
The long-recognised status of belligerent occupation 
must be clearly distinguished from whatever form of 
occupation existed in German territory after World War 
IX* Article A3 of The Regulations Reapectln? the Laws 
#nd Customs jgX ^  tand annexed to the Hague Con-
2
"Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and 
the Assumption of Supreme Authority with Respect to 
Germany," 39 (Supp) 171-172 (1945) emphasis
added*
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ventlon of 1907 declared;
The authority of the legitimate power 
having paeeed into the h&nde of the occupant, 
the latter shall take all step* in hie power 
to re-establish and Insure, a* far a# 
possible, public order and safety, while 
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, 
the laws in force in the country*3
By belligerent occupation the legitimate government is 
made incapable of exercising its authority and the 
authority of the occupant power is substituted only 
for the period of occupation* But the occupant power 
cannot assume soverignty over the occupied territory*
It must, as expressly stated in Article 43, respect 
the laws in force in the country at time of occupation, 
unless absolutely prevented* Further, it must at some 
time conclude a treaty of peace with the government 
of the occupied territory under its domination* The 
international jurist, Hans Kelsen, declares that belli­
gerent occupation "presupposes that a state of war still 
exists in the relationship between the occupant state 
and the state whose territory ia under belligerent 
occupation*"
"Convention with Respect to Laws and Customs of 
iar on Land," 1 (Supp) 148 (1907)*
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This condition Implies the continued existence 
of the state whose territory is occupied and, 
consequently, the continued existence of its 
government recognized as the legitimate bearer 
of the sovereignty of the occupied state, this 
is the reason why it is generally assumed that 
belligerent occupation does not confer upon 
the occupant power sovereignty over the 
occupied territory.4
If the state exercising belligerent occupation should
expel the legitimate government or the head of state,
some form of government must be allowed to continue
and be recognized as the legal one. Further, the occupant
has no right to divide the country for political purposes.
For instance, the division of Belgium by Germany into
French and Flemish zones during World War X, and the
encouragement of Flemish nationalism has been considered
to be a violation of international law. The conquering
power has no legal justification in setting up ^art of
the occupied territory as an independent state. Prior
to the First World War, George Grafton Wilson stressed
the point that:
4Hans Kelsen, "The Legal Status of Germany According 
to the Declaration of Berlin,** 39 51Ô (194)j.
5 
ibid.. 5ia.
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. . , military occupation (occuratio ballica).
, . , by tb« usage of nation» and the laws 
of war» differs from» and falls short of. 
the right of complete conquest (dobellatlo. 
wltioa victoria) . * » . Military occupation 
is an incident of war» and as such is not 
political in its effects^ It does not 
transfer sovereignty» hut giyes to the invading 
force the right to exercise control for the 
period of occupatioa.6
Discussing further the rights and limitations of belli­
gerent occupation» Wilson statedt
Military occupation in the strict sense is a 
term applicable only in time of war» and is 
the effective holding by force of an enemy 
territory. This would cease in fact when the 
force is withdrawn» and would cease from a 
legal point of view when b/ treaty of peace 
the war is at an end, 7
According to Bershey» writing during the First *orld
d&rt
Belligerent or military occupation should also 
be distinguished from conquest, ÎTie rights of 
a military occupant» howevt̂ r absolute» are in 
no wise those of a sovereign. They are merely 
provisional and are based upon military necessity, 
The occupant may not exact an oath of allegiance 
and his status is not even that of a temporary 
or substituted sovereign.8
6
George G, Wilson» International Law. 329-330 (1910), 
HI.
£ySuÈ'lls!'A05‘u9i&)?̂  lâSSSUêil s£
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Ô gç-Upatio bolliea. being of an ftaaentialljr provisional
character, does not serve to transfer sovereignty over
the occupied territory, notwithstanding the fact Umt
the jââ lure sovereign, during the period of occupancy,
9Is deprived of power to exercise Its rights as such. 
Belligerent occupation, being provisional in character.
Is essentially precarious since It io subject to the 
vicissitudes of war. It presupposes that war goes on 
in a factual sense; that the occupied state can still 
offer some resistance; and that continuance of resistance 
may result in changing the general situation. After 
World 'i;sr II, It was evident that belligerent occupation 
in the tr&ditional sense could not cover the case of 
Germany, Thus, the American jurist Kunz writes; "how­
ever, after the total defd&t of Nazi Germany, the 
situation was essentially different since the occupation 
had become firmly established; any resistance, any 
factual continuation of hostilities, any possibility
that the occupant might be driven out * . , all these10
were out of the question," The law of belligerent
9Charles Hyde, 3 International Lew. 1878 (3rd 2d.
1947).10
Josef L, Kuos, "The Status of Occupied Germany Un­
der International Law." 3 Western Political iuarterlv 
556 (1950).
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oceupation is atlll^a valid concept for lunm# but he,
s$ do mny others, denies that it wos applicable to
Germany after her unconditional surrender in 1945.
"Any attempt to construe Uie present status of occupied
Germany as simple belligerent occupation must necessarily
fail in view of the unsurmountable legal obstacle12
constituted by Article 4? of the H^gue rules." The 
American lawyer Friedman, analysing the legcl status of 
Germany, admits that revolutionary changes in the social 
structure of states and in the methods of modern war­
fare have made the majority of the rules of warfare 
obsolete. "But even the most elastic interpretation 
could not bring the wholesale abolition of laws, the 
de-Kaeification procedure, the arrest of thousanis of 
individuals, the introduction of ewceping social reforms, 
the expropriations of industries, and above all the 
sweeping changes in the territorial and constitutional 
structure of Germany within the rights of belligerent
11
âee Kelsen, loc. cit.. 513} Georg -cbw&raenberger, 
"A Ĉanual of Internat lonal Law," 91, 105 (1947) ; Quincy 
Wright, "The Law of the Nuremberg Trial," 41
12
Kuns, 538.
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13occupation#" Âlwyn Free^an, former Assistant to
the Legal Adviser of the United States Department
of State, examining the legpl character of belligerent
occupation, concludes:
• • « the Hague Regulations. • • are 
inapplicable to the situation now prevail­
ing in Germany. Disappearance of the 
German Gtate as a belligerent entity, 
necessarily implied in the Declaration 
of Berlin of June 5, 1943, signifies that 
a true state of war - hence belligerent 
occupation - no longer exists vithin the 
meaning of international law. The occupy­
ing authorities are exercising and are 
entitled to exercise all the attributes 
of sovereignty over the area. 14
from the foregoing discussion of belligerent 
occupation, one fact seems evident * in Germany, 
after the unconditional surrender of her armed forces, 
the essential conditions of occuoatio bellies in the 
traditional sense were lacking. In the three 
documents of military surrender signed by German mili­
tary leaders there appeared the stipulation, "It is 
independent of, without prejudice to, and will be 
superseded by, any general instrument of surrender
13W. Friedman, "The Allied Military Government 
of Germany," 3 Judicatae 135 (1947)
14
Alwyn V. Freeman, ^bar Crimes by Enemy Wationala 
Administering Justice in Occupied Territory," 41 
A.l.i.i. 605 (1947).
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Imposed by or oa behalf of the United Nations and 
applicable to Cermany and the German armed forces as 
a whole,** The June 5* 1945 Declaration, in which 
the Allies assumed supreme authority over the German 
territory, is the "general in. trument of surrender" 
alluded to in the three military surrender documents. 
Since the essential conditions of belligerent occupation 
were lacking at the end of the wur, it is obvious that 
the theory occunatio bellies in regard to Germany is 
untenable and thus, must be discarded.
Fiduciary OccupstiQn
The Swiss writer G, Sauser«-Hall, with recent 
support by an American jurist, Max Rbeinstein, has 
proposed another theory, that of fiduciary occupation, 
to describe the status of Germany. The concept 
pictures the occupant as holding the territory in some 
fora of trust, for the benefit of the occupied terri­
tory, Hheinstein, diecuasing fiduciary occupation, 
declares:
15
.59 (Supp) 169 (19W).16
Max Rheinstein, "The Legal Status of Occupied 
Germany," 47 KjghiKen Review 29-30 (1948),
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Havlng û99um%â *upr*me authority with 
respect to Oersiany, a country having no 
government able to epezik for heroelf and 
her people, the occupanta ere finding 
themaelvos in a fiduciary position • • • •
The fiduciary position of the occupant* 
implies, among others, a duty to preserve 
the capital assets of the German econo­
my, to restore the productive capacity 
of the country» to provide for an efficient 
and clean administrative machinery, to 
preserve Germany*# cultural identity, to 
reintegrate the German people into the 
economic and cultural world community, and 
to prevent diaease and starvation.16
it would seem that a territory under fiduciary occu­
pation is thuu in some way similar to a colony. Sut 
Allied pronouncements during and immediately after the 
war suggest that in reality the victors were concerned 
with safeguarding their own intereuta. As Kune points 
out:
. . .  prior to 1945 iieas were advocated, 
studies and preparations made, tending 
toward the destruction of Oeramny by way 
of dismemberment and not merely toward 
the disruption of the Nationalist Socia­
list regime in Germany. • • • Summer Welles 
. . . proposed a partition plan. The United 
States Secretary of the Treasury proposed 
his llorgenthau Plan, • • • that coupled the 
difimemberment of Germany with the proposal 
of her complete deindustrialisation and 
pasturalization, by making the Ruhr a 
pasture for goats. Diumemberment proposals 
and the Korgenthau flan, to a certain extent, 
were favored by President Rooswvelt who 
proposed at the Teheran Conference the 
partition of Germany into five autonomous 
states. . . .  Churchill advocated joining 
Bavaria with Austria. An intergovernmental
IS
Kax Rheinstein, "The Legal Gtatus of Occupied 
Germany," 47 KichiRan Law Review 29-30 (1948).
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Comoitftion for the Dismemberment of Germany 
waa oet up* 17
True, in the face of much opposition, the:,e plans and
ideas were modified or diamissei, but as Kuns has
noted, "reminiscences of it remain even in the events
18
and the doeumonts of 194)." These words in the Fotadam
Declaration are pertinent ;
Germany and the Gorman people have begun to atone 
for the terrible crimes coa,mitted under the 
leadership of those whom in the hour of their 
success, they openly approved and blindly obeyed 
• • * • In accordance with the Crimea decision 
that Germany be compelled to compensate to the 
greatest possible extent for the loss and suffer­
ing that she has caused to the United Bâtions 
and for which German people cannot escape res­
ponsibility, thé following agreement on repara­
tions was reached, • • 19
Reparation duties were imposed on the German people;
Poland received German territory; France detached the
Saar from Germany; and Germany was split up into four
sones of occupation, each under a different Power with
distinct political alms*
Therefore, there can be little doubt that in 1945»
Germany was to be punished, that reoonetiuction of her
economy was not a paramount consideration, and that the
17
^^Xuna, l££* £Ü,, 546-547*
547.
"Report on Tripartite Conference of Berlin," 39 
(supp) 247, 251 (1945).
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division of Germany into four zones of occupation lü&de 
it untenable to re^^rd that occupation as fiduciary in 
the face of Allied directives* attitudes and events 
prior to Germany's defeat and in the years 194$*19i6.
Intervention
Still another theory on the le&al status of Germany
proposed by Georg A* Zian and embraced by Adolf Arndt
is that of occur?tion of loterventica. This form of
occupation csn be imposed upon a state when it violates
well established principles of the law of nations. The
government of Nazi Germany, according to this view, had
been Illegal from its inception to its destruction in
194). Arndt stctna that "Hitler usurped power in Germany
through violence end fraud and • • . his yower was
always illegal and illegitimate, Consequently, there
was never ̂  lure a National Gociali&t state or Third
Reich, but only a National Socialist tyranny in the
German state, , « • Hitler came into power through terror
20
and remained in power through terror." Proponents of 
the doctrine of occupation of intervention are of the 
opinion that the last war was an international civil war 
fought for the rights and privileges of men. Following
20
Adolf Arndt, "Status and Development of Consti­
tutional Law in Germany," 260 The Annals 2-3 (November
1948).
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this lins of thought, th$ Allied nations intervened, 
or went to war with an illegal governmentj and upon 
the latter*8 defeat, the victorious powers occupied the 
territory by right of intervention. Somewhat similar 
to the position taken by fiduciary occupation, occupation 
of intervention implies that the Allies occupied Germany 
for the benefit of the country. As trustees of the 
territory and its inhabitants it is their task to re* 
construct the political life in that area and to return 
the people to a more democratic way of life.
It eppears, however, that the concept of occupation
of intervention is an foe solution with little basis
in general international Isw. Lauterpacht-Oppenheis
defines intervention thus;
dictatorial interference by a Jtate in the 
affairs of another State for the purpose of 
maintaining or altering the actual conditions 
of things, buch intervention can take place 
by rigfct or without (a) ri#ht,but it always 
concerns the external independence of the 
territorial or personal supremacy of the 
iState concerned, and the whole matter is 
therefore of forest Importance for the inter­
national position of States. That intervention 
is, as a rule, forbidden by the Law of Rations 
which protects the international personality 
of the States, there is no doubt. 21
It may be conceded that while some of Hitler*s methods
end motives were repulsive to the nations of the world,
he was careful in the year 1933 to avoid unconstitutional
21
Lsuterpacht-Oppenhelm, I Interns>tional Law, 272 
(7th 2d. m S ) .
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BtQtsures In his ris* to power. Re bec&m# the leader 
by virtue of & constitutional election. Naturally, his 
popularity was not overwhelming among all the Germans 
at first, but there seems to be little doubt that in 
the years following 1933 the majority of Carmans, after 
witnessing Germany's benefits under Nasi domination, 
supported Hitler voluntarily, Koreover, the principal 
nations continued to recognise Hitler and his government 
as sovereign ̂  lure, indicating little or no conviction 
that Hitler end his government were illegal, ThArefors, 
occupation of intervention does not seem plausible when 
applied to the status of Germany after World War II,
Kuns observes that "the literature has produced many 
ad hoc solutions, ouch as an occupation of intervention 
. , But these hoc solutions are legally untenable,
because they have no basis in general intematicnal law. 
Intervention without a particular legal title is un­
lawful under general international law."22
A German, Professor Verdross, offers still another 
theory as tw the legal position of occupied Germany in 
which he reasons that the Four Powers .xerci&e supreme 
authority in the higher organs of Oeraan political
Kuns, 539-540,
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machinery but that Geromn state power has continued to
23
exist in the lower organs* But legal sovereignty
has cOBBQonly been regarded as indivisible, and it
seems anomalous that sovereignty could exist in the
lower organs in the hands of one sovereign, and at the
same time, exist in the higher organs in the hands of
another sovereign* This theoretical difficulty is
obviated by specific terms of the Declaration of Berlin.
No German sovereignty has existed in the lower organs
since, by that Declaration, the Allies assumed "supreme
authority with respect to Germany, including all the
powers possessed by the German Government, the High
Command and any state, municipal, or local government 
24or authority/' Professor Verdross appears to have 
made a distinction between territorial sovereignty and 
mere territorial supremacy, that is, between sovereignty 
and mere exercise of sovereignty. The Allies, for 
Verdross, only exercise sovereignty. This view of 
occupied Gefmany, while theoretically tenable, seems 
unsupportable in the face of the Declaration of Berlins
23Ibid., 559 reporting correspondence with Verdross,
24
39 A.J.i.L. (3upp) 171-172.
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The Government» of the United Kingdom, the 
United ütatea of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics» and the 
Provisional Government of the French 
Republic, will hereafter .etermiae the 
boundaries of Germany or any part thereof 
and the status of Germany or of any area g. 
at present being part of German territory.^'
If the Allies merely exercised sovereignty, but were
not the actual territorial sovereigns, then how are we
to explain the situation in which the Allies decide the
disposition of territory? Kuns agrees that the distinction
made by Verdross between mere exercise of sovereignty and
actual territorial sovereignty, "is certainly a correct
one."
He who, as in the ease of cession for adminis­
tration, has only territorial supremacy is not 
the sovereign. He h»a only, . . . all the 
rights as if he were sovereign, but not of the 
sovereign; the right of sovereignty . . 
can be in another state. Only the sovereign 
has the 1ua disponendi over the territory, 
not he who has mere territorial supremacy. 26
But this was not the case in Germany. The Declaration
of Berlin, expressly stated that the Allies, "will
27hereafter determine the boundaries of Germany." There­
fore, Professor Verdross* theory seems not only un­
convincing, but erroneous.
25 172.
Kuns, log, cit.. 5)8-559.
39 (S«pp) m  (1945)
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1111% ̂
Of the four theories thus f^r examined none appear
to be tenable# To reiterate, Ger%a%y#s situation at
the end of the war was unique and unprecedented. The
country was conquered byt not annexed; and political
and legal ambiguities crept into the various declarations
and actions of the victors as disunity developed between
28
tho Three -eatern powers and the Joviet Union# Never­
theless, aince it is essential to find some legally 
acceptable theory of the status of Ger&aoy, a fifth 
theory, known as title bv conquest, will be discussed 
38 the moat promising concept#
Bans Kelsen has proposed a title by conquest doctrine 
for the status of Germany, maintaining that Germany ceased 
to exist as a sovereign state, &n: that har sovereignty 
was assumed and exercised by the victorious Pour Powers# 
According to Keleen, "The existence of an independent 
government is an essential element of a state in tho eyes 
of international law, • • • By abolishing the last 
Government of Germany the victorious powers have destroyed 
the existence of Germany as a sovereign state. Since 
her unconditional surrender, at least since the abolish­
ment of the Doenit* Government, Germany has ceased to
2*
Kuns, 2oc. sM,*» 545.
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exist as a state, the status of war has been terminated,
because such a status can exist only between belligerent 
29
states, .
Lauterpacht-Oppenheia, on the question of government
independence concurs with Kelsen, stating that, *A state
is in existence when a people is settled in a country
30
under its own sovereign Government,** Kelsen*s thesis, 
then, is that Germany was conquered and debellatio 
resulted opening the way for sovereignty in a condominium 
of the victors ov#r that territory. In international 
law a condominium is recognised as the joint exercise
31of sovereignty over some territory by two or more states.
Green Hackworth, legal adviser to the State Department
and American representative to the International Court
of Justice, states*
The conjoint exercise of sovereignty over a 
region by two or more states is denominated 
condominium. The joint action of Great 
Britain and Egypt in ti e Sudan and that of 
Great Britain and France in the Kew Hebrides 
have been referred to by writers as examples 
of condominium. 32
Lauterpacht-Oppenheia regard condominium as the foremost
Lauterpacht-Oppenheia, ££, cit.. 114.
31
Schwarsenberger, on, cit,,(Glossary IXXIX).
32
Green Hackworth, 1 Digest of International Law. 
56-57 (1940),
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and parhapa aol# exception to the general maxim of the 
Indivisibility of a single sovereignty over the same 
territory. "In this case a piece of territory consist­
ing of land or water Is under the joint tenancy of two 
or more states, these several states exercising sovereignty 
conjointly over it, and over the individuals living thereon.*
Thus Schleswig-Holstein and Lauenburg from 
1664 till 1666 were under the condominium of 
Austria and Prussia. . , and since 1939 the 
Islands of Canton and Sndenburg. . . have 
been under the joint control of Great Britain 
and the United States. . . . When on June 3,
1943, Great Britain, the United States,
Russia and France, in a Declaration regarding 
the defeat of Germany, assumed supreme authority 
over that country, they provided an example of 
joint exercise of sovereignty. 33
The ideas of Kelsen have gained wide support.
Including some Germans, especially a minority of
experts preparing the Bonn constitution and concurring
with Kelsen*a views that Germany as a sovereign state
34
had ceased to exist.
33Lauterpacht-Oppenhei®, cit.. 409, 411.
34
Kuns, 542, 543.
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A curiously Interesting case connected indirectly
with the status of Germany was noted recently in the
Hichiran Law Review. An American citizen living in
Germany voted for the election of local officials in
the American Zone of Occupation. For this act, the
American citizen was issued a certificate of loss of
nationality for having violated the Nationality Act of
1940 restricting Americans from voting in political
elections in a foreign state, A federal District Court
in Texas held that the petitioner had not lost her
citizenship since the election was held in territory
then ruled and governed by the United Jtates and was held
by permission and under the direction and by the authority
of the United States, and was not an election in a foreign
35
state within the meaning of the Nationality Act of 1940.
Before we evaluate the theory of title by conquest, 
attention must be given to the closely related meaning 
of debellatio in international law. There is a deep 
divergency in the literature regarding the legal con­
notation of debellatio. W d e m  Continental writers on
35Brehm v. Acheaon, 90 F. Supp. 662 (D. C. Tex.
1950)I noted, 49 Michigan Law Review 631, 6)4 (February
1951)
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the eubject emphasise factual considerations in use 
of the term. That is, if the enemy forces have been 
annihilated in fact, if occupation of the enemy state 
is total, if the government is destroyed, then the 
enemy state has ceased to exist as a sovereign state«
Thus debellatio. for Continental writers, is identical 
with conquest. Annexation is not legally necessary in36
order to make debellatio complete. The second school 
of thought on the other hand, claims that debellatio 
consists of conquest D^us subjugation and that sub­
jugation can only be effected through annexation. Lauter- 
pacht-Oppenheim, representative of the Anglo-American 
school, denies that conquest alone is able to bring about 
subjugation and thus debellatio. "Conquest is only a 
mode of acquisition if the conqueror, after having 
firmly established the conquest, formally annexes the 
territory. Such annexation makes the enemy State cease 
ro exist, and thereby brings the war to an end. . . it 
is conquest followed by subjugation, and not conquest
alone, which gives a title, and is a mode of acquiring 
37territory;' Westlake declaredt "The extinction of a 
state by conquest will take place when the conquering
36
Kuns, 12£. £11., 552.
37
Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, ££. £ll., 518.
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power has declared Its will to annex it and has 38
established its authority throughout the territory.. . 
Fenwick concurs, declaring that conquest is usually 
described as subjugation, but that this should only 
occur when conquest is followed by formal annexation 
of the defeated territory. The sovereignty and inter­
national personality of the state is destroyed when
there is conquest plus subjugation; subjugation, of
39course, entailing formal annexation.
Some additional minor points must be examined. The
question might be raised: is debellatio accepted as
legal in the law of nations? At first glance the answer
would have to be in the negative, for much opposition
to the doctrine has arisen. Further, it is not denied
that tenddencies have appeared in this century which
have endeavored to place limitations on title by conquest.
These tendencies found expression in numerous Pan-American 
40
declarations. But these tendencies, however admirable, 
are not yet a new rule of general international law.
 P --------John Westlake, International Law. 64 (1904).
39 ,Charles Fenwick, International Law. 661 (3rd Ed*
1948).
40
Kuns, loc. cit.. 551.
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H/d« concedes that while it would be commendable if
the nations of the world would outlaw this title by
conquest, he is forcad to Lit, as do others, that
no rule has yet been accepted which legally abolishes
41
conquest as a mode of acquisition of territory.
As Sir John Fisher-Willlams stated:
Conquest is often, though not always, a moral 
wrong. But it is not illegal and it produces 
legal results. &e shall not advance tha cause 
of peace and international order by seeking to 
deny that war produces results - such as the 
acquisition of territory • which it does in 
fact produce. If we want to stop the forcible 
acquisition of territory, we mupt stop private 
war. 42
Title by conquest, though cofrimon in the day of Grotius, 
had almost disappeared by the end of the nineteenth 
century. But there is no evidence that it had been out­
lawed by the international community, and it did reappear 
in the twentieth century, as evidenced by the conquest 
of the Hoer Republics in 1900 by Great Britain, and the 
co'̂ quest of uthiopia by Italy in 1937. Doubtless, the
41
Hyde, ''Conque&t Today," 30 471, 476 (1936)
42
Sir John Fisher-iilliams, "Sovereignty, Seisin 
and the Leüçue," 7 British Yearbook of Interriâtional 
Law 41 (192o), hereafter cited
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world would benefit by Its outlawry^ but this has not 
yet been achieved. General International law knows of 
no rule yet which placo* restrictions on title by 
eonqueat, and it appears sound to say that title by 
conquest Is still legally valid.
To return now to the matter of the two schools of 
doctrine on debellatio: we have seen how the Anglo- 
American school insists that title by conquest is only 
achieved when the conquering power has effectively 
occupied the enemy's tfT'^tory and then formally annexed 
it. Tet| regarding Germany, the Allies in the June 5»
1945 Declaration explicitly declared that it was not 
their intention to annex the German territory. If we 
then follow Anglo-American doctrine, the Allies are not 
sovereign occupants, for Germany, although conquered, 
was certainly not annexed. The Anglo-American inter­
pretation may be too rigidly conceptual. It seems that 
if a state is in a position to annex an enemy's territory, 
it coincidentally has the right to impose less harsh 
methods. That is, the conqueror could hold the territory 
on a temporary basis. "Under international law," accord­
ing to Wright, "a state may acquire sovereignty of 
territory by declaration of annexation after subjugation 
of the territory." However, this American writer goes 
on to say that, ". . .  it appears that if a state or
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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stat«» er« in a position to annex a territory they
have the ri^ht to declare the leaser policy of
exercising sovereignty temporarily for specified purposes
with the intention of eventually transferring the
43
sovereignty to someone else.**
Kuns concurs1
ift’hile the situation. . . could be construed 
as healed by the principle of effactivity 
that is a norm of positive general inter­
national law, it is not necessary to resort 
to this construction. The legal basis of the 
present occupation is conquest; the con­
queror has a riht to annex the conquered 
state, but can also take other measures.
He can, particularly, intend to preserve the 80verei;;nty of the conquered state. That 
was the d dared intention of the conquerors 
of Germany, 44
The literature on methods of acquiring territorial
sovereignty usually recogniyes five modes to attain 
45such ends. The British writer, K&nn, though not 
repudiating the general view that conquest followed 
by annexation is the usual procedure, suggests that 
this is not the only possibility. "It must be admitted 
that there is no a priori reason why the categories of 
methods of acquiring territorial sovereignty should 
be considered cloced. Intern.:tronal law is not so
10,. ,11.. 50.
Kunz, loc. cit.. 564.
Herbert Briggs, The Law of Rations. 182,183 (1933).
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rlgld at to exclude new development*. It may well
be» therefore» titiat there existe a sixth method of
46
acquiring territorial sovereignty. . In the
words of Kelsent
The existence of a etate is destroyed by 
it# adversary when the latter haa not only 
annihilated the armed force* but also 
abolished the government of the former.
The establishment of territorial sovereign­
ty doe* not depend on the new sovereign*# 
intention to hold the territory for good. . . .  
if there 1# a difference at all between formal 
annexation and placing the territory under the 
conqueror*» sovereignty without the latter*# 
intention to hold it permanently» it is rather 
a political than legal one. 47
Schwarsenberger point# out that the Allie# at the end 
of World War II could have done any one of three 
things, they could have annexed all or some of the 
German territory; they could regard the German terri­
tory as re# nulliusi or they could have established 
the German territory aa a new international person» 
over which they might exercise a condominium and 
ultimately return the territory to the sovereignty of 
the German people. Of the three choices» Schwsr&enberger
46
F, A. Fiann, "the Present Legal Statu# of Germany»** 
1 Intiwrmjtiqnal l^w Quarterly 326 U947).
47
Kelsen, 521.
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continues, the hXIIcs adopted the ^nd est.biished
48
a condon̂ lniua over Gerr̂ n̂y, Cvoa L&uterp&cht- 
Oppenhoim, while strictly œaintô ninjr: that title by 
conquest 1» acquired after tho ccnv,uered territory 
is forxally annexed, makes the concession that con­
quered territory, though not annexed, continues to be
49in possession and under the owcy of the conqueror.
A German philosopher, Jurgen von Keapski, takes a
slightly different view from both schools, regarding
subjugation as a much broader concept than that proposed
by Lauterpacht-Cppenheim and the Anglo-Americcn school
on debellatio. ‘'Ever/ annexation," states Kempski,
"is indeed a subjugation but a subjugation does not
50
have to be an annexation." Von Kempaki* s view is 
close to that of the Continental school; while this 
school accepts title by simple conquest, von Kempski, 
admitting title by subjugation, is 'till leas rigid in 
his conception. The British writer Jennings asserts:
48
Gchwarcenbergor, 1 iH. 1^2 (2nd
Sd. 1950).
49Lauteroacht-Onoenheim. 1 International taw 519 
(7th td. 1948).
50 Jurgen von Rempski, "Deutschland Ala Volkerrechts* 
problem," 1 Merkur 191-192 (1947).
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GtrmfiOf V9.9 so completely at the disposal 
of the Allies as to Justify thea in law in 
annexing the German state; it would seem 
to follow that they are by the same token 
entitled to assume the rights of supreme 
authority unaccompanied by annexation. 51
Returning to the question which of the two doctrines 
of debellatio seems the most plausible, it is obvious 
that the traditional Anglo-American view is too rigid 
to accomodate Uie facts ih Germany, n.e Allies were 
certainly legally entitled to annex Germany, but this 
was not their desire. :A.ev<kr, it is not very convincing 
to say that their failure to aunex invalidates the claim 
that they are sovereigns in Germany. Surely, they were 
entitled to take whatever measures they wished once 
Germany was totally defeated. Moreover, the traditional 
Anglo-American position is attacked by foremost Anglo- 
American writers on international law. The Continental 
doctrine, in general, more closely cover# the facts in 
Germany. For this school, an enemy state is totally 
defeated and conquered and the conqueror, aa the 
sovereign over the territory, pursues whatever measures 
he deems fit. Further, the Continental school appears 
more humanitarian in that it does not require that 
annexation must follow. Thus the Continental school 
most nearly accommodates the unprecedented situation
51H. T. Jennings, "Government in Commission," 
23 l.I.i.L. 137 (1946).
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in Oermany in 1945 to the more orthodox le^al channels
of international law*
Still another group of writers concur in the
thesis that C&rsi&ny baa ceased to exist, but do not
touch upon the divergent view on debellatio. These
writers assume that Germany has ceased to exist,
simply by virtue of her unconditional surrender end
the Berlin Declaration. Finch states:
With the unconditional surrender of Germany, 
its government went out of existence as a 
sovereign state and its sovereignty is now 
held in trust by the condominium of the oc­
cupying powers, 52
The American Jurist Karl Loewenatein has written:
By the Four Power Statement of June 5, 1945# 
the Inter-Allied Control Authority, Control 
Council, was established in Borlin ae the 
supreme authority for occupied Germany in 
lieu of the non-exieting central Geman 
government, 53
Kheinstein agrees with Finch and Loewenatein:
52
George A, Finch, **The Nuremberg Trial and 
International Law," 41 A.J.l.L, 22 (1947).
53Karl Loewenatein, "Law and Legislative Process 
in Occupied Germany," 57 Tale Low Journal 725 (1947- 
46),
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R« who ha# ««suotad all th# powara of th#
Geraan govammant 1@ tha German goTernmeat. 
Rene#, there exifita a German government and 
thla government resta with the four occupy- 
log Power#• 54
To recapitulate, five different thooriea on the 
status of Germany have been examined: belli&erent
occupation; fiduciary occupation; occupation of 
intervention; dual sovereignty; and title by conquest, 
or debellatio. Of the five, the last, title by conquest 
a# understood by the Continental writers, appears to 
be the most tenable.
It has been nuceaaary bore to establish Germany's 
status St the end of World Uur II for two reasons.
First, the very fact th«;t the Allies became sovereign 
on Ge%%sn territory may be found to affect the basis 
of Jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Jecond, in view of 
Allied sovereignty in Germany, ccnaent from Germany 
was not an indispensable condition for legal validity 
in the trial of her war criminals.
54
Sheinstein, loc. cit.. 25.
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CHAFTEn III
XKTEa?r..;TATlCa Cf THE JURISDICTION 
CP THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TaiSUNAL
Critics of the Kureabcrg Trial, with firm and
perhaps sincere conviction, challenged the ri#it of
victorious nations to prosecute and convict individuals
who were moBbers of a v n^uished state without the
consent of that state. The challenge was based on the
well established rule of general intemotional law
denying a state jurisdiction over acts of another
state and its nationals without consent of that state.
Quincy kright notes that "Sovereign states. # . cannot
be subjected to foreign jurisdiction without their
consent." Kelsen declares;
The principle that no state has jurisdiction 
over acta of another state applies also to 
the jurisdiction of a tribunal established 
by an international agreement with respect 
to acts of a state not a contracting party 
to the agreement. 2
1
Quincy Wright, "Law of the Nuremberg Trial," 
U  A.i.i.JL. 46 (1947).
Hans Kelsen, Princioles of International Law. 
230(1952).
•6 4»
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"The jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals,"
according to -chwsrzenberger, "depends on the consent
of the parties concerned," A niuiber of other writers
4
concur in this view.
The Allies, at the torain^tion of world v;ar I, 
observed the rule that & state h^s jurisdiction over 
acts of another st%te onl/ with the latter*s consent. 
Certain Articles, {22Ô, 229 and 230) were inserted in 
the Treaty of Versailles and ca^e to be regarded as 
the punitive Articles, The Versailles Treaty, establish­
ing criminal responsibility of the German O^peror and 
others for violation^ of internutiinal law committed 
in their capacity as agents of the German deich, was 
Hîtified by Germany, It is evident however, that the 
situation at the end of aorld iar II was essentially 
different. As we have seen, there ia a tenable argument 
to be made that, in the a^noe of international law, 
Germany had ceased to exist.
The four Powers exercising condominium over Germany 
thus could htve created a municipal court competent 
to try Carman major war criminals. But this procedure 
was not followed. Instead, these Powers met London
3Georg Gchwarzenbe: ger, A Manual of In ..ematianal 
Law. 238 (1952).
4
Philip C, Jesau';, "Co:apet«nce of Courts in negard 
to Foreign Gtates," 26 456 (Supp 1932)/Charles
Fenwick, International Law. 3Ü9, 309 (3rd Ed, 1948).
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Augudt d, 1945 and signed an agreement for the 
establishment of an international military tribunal 
for the trial of all European Axis major war criminals*
It must be emphasised, nevertheless, that allied 
soverei^t/ in Germany waa important, for if Germany 
had not ceased to exist, then the oignatorias to the 
Agreement needed her consent*
It may be tenable to assume that the London Agreement 
was the international basis for the Tribunal for various 
reasons. Fir.t, the Tribunal was the offspring of an 
international treaty and derived its creation and 
jurisdiction from such a treaty in the same manner as 
any other international court, comission or board*
Second, the adherence of nineteen other members of the 
United Nations to the principles of the Agreement lent 
some persuasiveness to the contention that the Tribunal 
was international. Third, though it is conceded that 
the Agreement created an agency for the application 
of traditional international law when the Tribunal was 
empowered to try traditional war crimes, it went beyond 
this and established conventional law by commissioning 
the Tribunal to try individuals on charges of crimes 
against humanity*
It may also be tenable to say that the London
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Agmeæent, though formally establishing an international 
tribunal, was In substance actually creating a Joint- 
national tribunal. Uo doubt exists that such a tribunal 
would have had Jurisdiction to try Individuals for 
traditional war crimes by resorting to principles of 
general international law. By analogy, the Judicial 
organs of any nation may punish pirutea for having 
committed acta In violation of the laws of nations.
But the Nuremberg Tribunal did not stay within the scope 
of traditional war crimes, for It prosecuted and punished 
also those persons guilty of having cô wiltted crimes
5Kelsen, £d. cit.. 124-125; Cut whereas according 
to international law the criminal Jurisdiction of 
municipal law la ordinarily restricted to crimis com­
mitted on Its terra firua or territorial waters or Its 
own ships, and to crimes b Its own nationals wherever 
committed. It is also recognized «s extending to piracy 
committed on the high seas by any national on any ship, 
because a person guilty of such piracy has placed him­
self beyond the protection of any ütate. In iCe Mracy 
Jure Gentium, Great Britain; Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council, (1934), reprinted .̂n Brings, The law 
of Nations, 361, 263 (1938).
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against humanity, as defined in the Charter ann^xud to
the Agreement. If it is maintained that it was a joint-
national tribunal & difficulty ari es, because it would
then appear to be a national tribunal applying ̂  hoe
treaty l&w and an £d hoc tribunal applying; hoe law,
Schwarsenberger miikes this point, that "the status of
the Tribunal within the judicial hisrarchy of municipal
courts and tribunals of the states which shared it was6
that of a military £d hoe tribunal." however, if the 
words of the international Military Tribunal sumraoning 
allied sovereignty for support in its resort to muni­
cipal law are accepted at face value, the ed hoc 
objection may perhaps be circumvented. The Tribunal 
declared that "The making of the Charter was the exercise 
of the sovereign legislative power b* the countries to
7which the German %eich unconditiunall/ surrendered, .
To give additional strength to the contention that
6
dch«arzonberg»r, 1 Intfn’ndtional Law. )14 (2nd 
Hd. Iv49).
7Oninion and JudrTn?nt. 48.
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the Power* intended to create &erely a joxnt-iational 
tribunal, Article 1 of the London /̂ greeæent may be 
quoted :
There shall be established after consultation 
with the Control Council for Geraany an Inter­
national Military Tribunal for the trial of 
war cri&^nals -hose offenses have no parti­
cular geographical location whether they be 
accused individual!/ or in their capacity am 
meœbers of organizations or groupa or in 
both capacities. 6
From this Article one might argue that if the Tribunal 
was internatiowal, with the power to try all nxia major 
criminals there was no need to consult the Control 
Council for Germany on the establishment of an inter­
national court. Further, in Article 29 of the Charter 
annexed to the Agreement there is the provision that 
the sentences to be imposed upon those found guilty 
should be carried out in accordance with the orders 
of the Control Council for Germany; and the power to 
reduce or alter the sentences is, according to this 
Article, within the domain of the Control Council. 
Moreover, on December 20, 194$, Control Council Law 
Ko. 10 was en*i>cted. This Law, enacted more t^an a 
month after the Tribunal commenced its work, declared 
that:
a
Robert H. Jackson, The Cape Ag-ainst the Nazi or 
Criminals. 96 (1946).
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In order to /Iva effect to the terms of the
Koscow Ooclarutxon of 30 Octobsr 1943 and the 
London Agreeaient of 8 August 1945* end the 
Charter pursuant thereto and in order to 
establish a unii'ons legal basis in Oenaany 
for the prosecution of war criminals and 
other SiBular offenders, other than those 
dealt with by the intern.-vtic>nal military 
Tribunal, the Control Council enacts as follows 
. . . The Moscow Declaration of 30 uctober 
1943. . . and the London Agreement of 8 October 
1945 ^Concerning the Prosecution and Punishment 
of Major i.ar Criminals of the European Axis’* 
are snde integral parts of this law. 9
Thus Law 10 besides creating a uniform le^ul b.sia for
the prosecution of war criminals other than those to
be dealt with by the International Military Tribunal,
declared that it ?. >ve effect, thon.-̂ h belatedly, to the
London A,̂ re@ment and Charter and made both of them
Inteî ral parts of the Law, It has been argued that
Law 10, by using the words "to give effect," and "are
made integral parts of this Low," sought to give
legislative authority to the wonion Â 'reeaisnt. Prana
Cchick, Professor of Political Cience at the Univerisity
of Utah has st&teds
i Conclnation 358 (April 1949)» emphasis added.
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It la, therefore. Control Council Law No. 10, 
and not the London Â ireeaient, which r„uot be 
considered tho legal t.sia for the Nuremberg 
trial. Ko doubt exists that the Control Council 
at Berlin was competent to proclaim such a law 
since the Allied Powers, on the basis of the 
Potadam Declaration, h«d assumed supreme 
autrorit/ with respect to Germany, including 
all the powers possessed by the German Govern­
ment, the High Command and any Gtate, municipal, 
or local government or authority, and since, 
according to a declaration issued on the same 
day, this supreme authority over Germany was 
to be exercised, on instructions from their 
Governments, by the Govict, British, United 
Btates, and French Commanders-in-Chief, each 
in his own zone of occupât! n, and also jointly, 
in matters affecting Germany as a whole. . . .  
Control Council Law No. 10, succeeded belatedly 
in establishing the legal basis for the pro?^ 
secution of German major war criminals. . .1̂
Prom this it might be implied that the jurisdiction of
the International Fiilitary Tribunal had been delegated
to it by the Control Council as the body exercising
supreme authority in Germany. Thus it would follow
that in substance the Nuremberg Tribunal was of a
joint-nat*onal character.
But the assumption that Control Council Law 10 
gave a legal be sis to the Tribunal must be disidssed. 
The Charter for the Kurcmbsrg Tribunal annexed to the 
London Agreement provided for the trial of all major 
war criminals of the European Axis. Here lies the
10
Frans jchick, "Xntîfrnational Criminal Law - Facts 
and Illusions," 11 The Kodern Lew A?view 297-^;S (1948).
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inconsistency, How could the Tribunal, if it 
received its powers from Control Council Law No, 10, 
exercise authority broader than that of the Control 
Council for Germany by stating that it would prosecute 
all major European Axis war criminals, while the 
Control Council had legislative power only over the 
German territory?
There is no doubt that statements in the Tribunal* s 
Judgment, in Article 1 of the London Agreement and in 
Article 29 of the Charter contained ambiguities.
Perhaps the chief reason for this was that the four 
sovereign nations in Germany and signatories to the 
Agreement were somewhat uncertain in when creating 
such a novel experiment as the Tribunal, and that this 
confusion led to ambiguity of official languate. Or it 
might be argued that the four Powers were not satisfied 
that the London Agreement by itself could vest 
jurisdiction in the International Military Tribunal, 
and sought a firmer basis, notably, Allied supreme 
authority in Germany,
However, Schwarzenberger presents a seemingly 
formidable argument that the Tribunal had a dual 
source of jurisdiction and was joint-national in 
substance. In the view of this jurist, the duality of 
jurisdiction rests upon the London Agreement and Allied
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sovereignty In Cerscanyj
The international b&ol* of the fcuremborg 
Tribunal was provided by the Agreement of 
August 6* 1965,. • • • There was, however, 
another source of the Tribunal*« jurisdiction: 
the exercise by the occu//in^ Powers of 
condominium over Germany. 11
It may be argued against vchwarrenberger*s contention 
that the Charter of the International Military Tribunal 
stipulated that ail major war criminals of the European 
Axis, not merely Germany, would be tried. It is con­
ceded that in practice only Germans were prosecuted 
and punished by the Nuremberg Tribunal, but it was the 
declared intention of the Jignatories to try all 
European Axis criminals, if the Allies had specifi­
cally stated that they wo:ld bring only German major 
war criminals before thQ International Military Tribunal, 
th-n it would be reasonable to say that the Tribunal 
had a dual source of jurisdiction; in fact, the 
London Agreement would not even have been necesa&ry.
The Control Council for Germany exercising condominium 
over the territory could legally liave established a 
court for the prosecution of the alleced German criminals.
On the ffiStter of the joint-national ch;*ructer of 
the Tribunal ^chwarzenbergsr states*
 n ---------
ochwarî©nbery;er, 1 international Law. 314 (2nd 
Ed. 1950).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
•74-
• • • th« Nuremberg Tribunal may claim to 
be international in the formal aense of 
the word. . . # It derivea its existence 
and Jurisdiction from an international 
treaty. . . .  It appears, however, to have 
been the intention of the parties to establish 
in substance Joint military tribunals under 
municipal law rather than a truly international 
tribunal. 12
He aupporta this view by reference to two facts. First, 
a declaration by the Tribunal states that the Signatory 
Powers created the Tribunal and, "In doing so they have
13done together vrhat any of them might have done singly."
Secondly, Justice Jackson stated that "One of the reasons
this Tribunal was constituted as a military tribunal
instead of an ordinary court of law was to avoid the
precedent-creating effect of what is done here on our
own law and the precedent control which would exist14
if this were an ordinary judicial body."
In making the first point that the Tribunal was a 
joint national tribunal in substance, ^chwarsenbar^er 
overlooks an important matter. It is conceded that a 
single nation has the power to try enemy wa. criminals 
who have committed crimes against this nation once they
12
iMl-f 311.
Opinion and Judgment. 48.
143chwar%enberger, £2* 313, quoting Justice
Jackson.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
-75-
are within its power. However, a single nation could
not try individuals for hovicg committed crimes af^axnst 
15other states. Yet, this is exactly what the
Nuremberg Tribunal was doing. Great Britain, irance,
Russia and the United States were prosecuting enemy
war criminals who not only committed crimes aga&nst
them but against many other nations.
On the a-cond point ^cwarsenberjer, analysing
Jackson's statement that the Tribunal **was constituted
as a military tribunal. . . to avoid the precedent-
16
creating effect. • ." concludes that the Tribunal 
was a joint-national tribunal for if it had been truly 
iDLern&tional, it did not require the title of military, 
since international tribunals do not create precedents. 
It does not follow, however, that making the Tribunal 
military m̂ vde it joint-national. .»ar criminals are 
usually tried before military cours. It seems quite 
as reasonable to argue that Jackson's words were merely 
precautionary agsinot setting precedents, as it is to 
argue 3chwar%enb%rger's view, that imposing the title 
of military ujon the tribunal mude it joint-national 
in substance, ^chwarzenber&er, perhaps unintentionally,
15
Piracy ie an exception. Keltjen, cit.. 124-125.
16
Ochwarzenberger, clt.. 312, quoting Justice 
Jackson.
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supported the contention that celling the Nuremberg 
Tribunal military does not necessarily myke it joint- 
national when he stated that *Under international 
customary Ikw persons accused of war crimes are entitled 
to trial by a military court of the eneay. To this 
extent the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal is merely 
declaratory of international customary law. By appoint­
ing a Major-General Jurisprudence as a member of the 
Tribunal and a Lieutenant-Colonel as his alternate, the
Soviet Union emphasised the traditional character of
17such proceedings." It is not denied that here 
Schwarzenbergsr is speaking of national or joint- 
national tribunals, but it must be remembered that the 
International Tribunal at Nuremberg vas also trying 
enemy war criminals and therefore, was justified in 
having the title of military.
Before conclusions can be reached as to the source 
of jurisdiction of the Tribunal and its character, a 
further argument must be presented. Counsel for defense 
of the twenty-four accused criminals challenged the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal on the grounds that the
17
Ibid.. 310.
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th» Tribunal was iad« up of members of the victcrijua
Powers and that neither Germany nor neutral states18
were represented. We might dismiss this view on
the /round of the stimulation in Article 3 of the
Charter that ’’Neither the Tribunal, its members nor
their alternates can be challenged by the prosecution,
19or by the refendants or their Counsel,” However it 
seems proper to point out that much could be said in 
support of the view that neutrals should have been 
represented on the Tribunal. But this was not legally 
necessary and the I'efensc had little basis for its 
challenge on this point, Üoreovcr, there were few 
neutrals at the termination of horld I'̂ar 11. Gn the 
matter of Germans baing represented, this too was not 
legally necessf»ry. Germany had ceased to oxist. It 
is conceded, however, that it have been more
satisfactory as far as German sentiment was concerned 
if one of their compatriots i/ere present, but the fact 
that this was not the casa does not detract anything 
from the jurisdiction of the Court, As ^chwar&enberger 
stated:
18
Karl Corsniroc/. (I'upp ÎJ) 1, 3.
19International Ccnf*?rt^nce on i.ilite-rv Trxcls. 422,
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. . . the provision in the Charter that 
neither the Tribunal nor its members can 
be challenged is compatible with the 
minimum standards lAiich, under international 
customary law, persons accused of war crimes 
. . . may expect to be observed towards them. 
Kor have persons accused of war crimes any 
claim to be judged by nationals of neutral 
countries or to have one of their co-nationala 
on the bench. . • 20
Some of the problems need restatement. To say 
that the intention of the Allies was to create in 
substance a joint-national tribunal seems plausible 
for much of the afore-mentioned points in favor of such 
a view. However, it is more tenable to say that the 
Nuremberg Court derived its jurisdiction from the 
London Agreement and that the Tribunal was one of truly 
international character. The reasons for this con­
tention have already been given. Further support can 
be drawn from the ease with which the Signatories 
amalgamated rules of evidence and procedure. If the 
Tribunal was contemplated as a joint-national court, 
there would have been less readiness to abandon parti­
cular national principles of evidence and procedure.
As Wright notes, *. , . it has never been contended
that those rules of evidence are required by inter- 21
national law," Moreover, crimes purported against
20
Schwarzenberger, 0£. cit.. 312.
^\uincy Wright, "The Law of the Nuremberg Trial," 
41 A.J.I.L. p. 53 (1947).
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intern&tional l*w are violations of b^aio interests 
protected by the law of nations. Thus» according to 
Wright, the/ "may not be adequately punished by the 
exercise of the normal criminal jurisdiction of any 
state. • • • International law has recognised the 
competence of states to establish international tri­
bunals for the trial of grave offenses not dealt with
22
by national tribunals such as terrorism and Aggression.**
Notwithstanding the London Agreement as a source
of jurisdiction for the Nuremberg Court, it seems that
the Tribunal did go beyond this to uvoke a second source
of jurisdiction - general principles of international
law - when it declaredt
It was submitted that international law is 
concerned with the actions of sovereign 
States, and provides no punishment for in­
dividuals; and further, thut where the act 
in question is an act of state, those who 
carry it out are not personally responsible, 
but are protected by the doctrine of the 
sovereignty of 3tate. In the opinion of the 
Tribunal, both thesw submissions must be 
rejected. That international law imposes 
duties and liabilities upon individuals as 
well as upon dt&tes has long been recognised 
• • * • The principle of international law, 
which under certain circumstances, protects 
the representatives of a state, cannot be 
applied to acts which are condemned as 
criminal by international law. 23
22
Opinion ajî̂  Judgment. 4Ô, 33.
23Opinion and Judgment. 32, 53*
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From this etatemant we see that the Tribunal was of
the opinion that individuals and not abstract entities
commit crimes which violate international norms, and
when such persons are punished, then the law of n̂ t̂ions
la being enforced. Since a large amount of Justice
Jackson's views were eaioodied an the Judjjicnt by the
Tribunal, one of his passages may be noted in which he
speaks of internationally accepted standards of just
conduct &ni seems to su:geot emergent positive law:
Those acts which offended the conscience of 
our people were criminal by standards generally 
accepted in all civilised countries, and I 
believe that we may proceed to punish those 
responsible in full accord with both our own 
traditions of fairness and with standards 
of just conduct which have teen internationally 
accepted. . . .  in troubled times, progress 
toward an effective rule of law in the 
international community is alow indeed.
Xntertia re.sts more heavily upon the society 
of nations than upon any othwr society, how 
we st'ïDd at one of those rare moments when the 
thourht and institutions and habits of the 
world have been shaken by the impact of world 
war on the lives of countless million, uuch 
occasions rarely come and ûickly pass, ie 
are put under a heavy responsibility to lee 
that our behavior during this unsettled period 
will direct the world's thoug't t toward a 
firmer enforcement of the laws of international 
conduct, so as to make war le:s attractive 
to those who have governments and destinies 
of peoples in their power. 24
24Opinion and Judgment. )2, .
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Quite obviouaXy and naturally the Allies were 
dedicated to the prosecution of those men who prior 
to and during the war had committed acts repulsive 
to mankind* But their punishments were to le applied 
through legal norms* for this reason the Tribunal 
wanted a sound legal busis for its jurisdiction. It 
ie the contention of this study that the le^aX basis 
was to be found in an international treaty - the 
London Agreement. But it also appears that the 
Tribunal appealed to the body of general principles 
of international law as a more general basis of 
Jurisdiction* "Thus," concedes Briggs, * . * the 
resort to general principles of law is an accepted 
judicial procedure which • • * may, in effect, extend25
the scope or content of international law,®
The Tribunal's reliance open general principles 
of the lew of nations as a second source of jurisdiction 
may have juatificution, for in the lumbdiate circums­
tances it was difficult for the Tribunal to rest its 
basis entirely on strict legal amxims in view of the 
dynamic character of the society of nations* Jackson 
eloquently touched upon the central question when 
he said;
25
ijriggs. The Law of Nations. 21 (2nd od* 1952).
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It is true, of course, that we have no 
judicial precedent for the Charter, But 
International Law is more than a scholarly 
collection of abstract and immutable 
principles. It is an outgrowth of treaties 
and agreements between nations and of accep­
ted custom, let every custom has its origin 
in soma single act, and every agreement has 
to be initiated by the action of some state. 
Unless we are prepared to abandon every 
principle of growth for International Law, 
we cannot deny that our day has the right 
to institute customs and to conclude agree­
ments that will themselves become sources of 
a newer and strengthened International Law, 
International Law is not capable of develop­
ment by the normal process of legislation 
for there is no continuing international 
legislative authority. Innovations and 
revisions in International Law are brought 
about by the action of governments designed 
to meet change in circumstances, 26
26
International Conference on Military Trials.
51-52.
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CKÂHTSa oy THii INTJ&NATiCNAL ^ULITA.iT T^iBUKAL
!• Constitution of the International Military Tribunal.
Artiela 1. In pursuance of the Agreement aitned on the 
Sth day of Aujruat 1945 by the Government of the United 
States of America, the Provisional Government of the 
French Republic, the Government of the United KlOf̂ dom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Govern­
ment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, there 
shall be established an Intern,tional Military Tribunal 
(hereinafter called "the Tribunal") for the Just and 
prompt trial and punishment of the &ajor war criminals 
of the European Axle.
Article 2. The Tribunal shall consist of four members, 
each with an alternate. One member and one alternate 
shall be appointed by each of the Signatories. The alter* 
nates shall, so far as they are able, be present at all 
sessions of the Tribunal, in case of illness of any 
member of the Tribunal or his incapacity for some other 
reason to fulfill his functions, his alternate shall 
take his place.
Article 3. Neither the Tribunal, ita members nor their
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alternâtos can be challenged by the prosacutJion, or by 
the Defendants or their Counsel, i-ach ui^natory aay 
replace its member of the Tribunal or his alternate for 
reasons of health or for other rood reasons, except 
that no replacement may take place during a Trial, 
other than by an alternate.
Article i.
(a) The pr: ence of all four members of the Tri­
bunal or the alternate for any absent member shall be 
necessary to constitute the quorum.
(b) The members of the Tribunal shall, before 
any trial begins, . ̂ ree aaicn<s themselves upon the 
selection from their number of a President, and the 
President shall hold office during that trial, or aa 
may otherwise be agreed by a vote of not less than three 
members. The principle of rotation of presidency for 
successive trials is agreed. If, however, a session of 
the Tribunal takes plüce on the territory of one of the 
four Signatories, the representative of that Signatory 
on the Tribunal shall preside.
{e) Gave as afores*id the Tribunal shall take 
decisions by a majority vote and in case the votes 
are evenly divided, the vote of the President shall be 
decisive! provided always that convictions and
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8entenc«ô mhall only be imposed by ôffiirnative votes 
of at least three members of the Tribunal*
Article 5« In case of need ijnJ depending on the number 
of the Clatters to be tried, other Tribunals may te set 
upj and the establishment, 1'unctions, and procedure 
of each Tribunal shall be identical, and shall be 
governed by this Charter*
11* Juristiction and General Principles
Article 6* The Tribunal ^stabliGked ty the Agreement 
referred to in Article 1 hereof for the trial and 
punishment of the major war criminals of the European 
Axis countries shall have the power to try and punish 
persons who, acting in the interests of the European 
Axis countries, whether as individuals or as members of 
oriranixations, committed any of the following; crimes*
The following acts, or any of theu, are crimes 
coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for 
which there shall be individual responsibility;
(a) Crimes A^aln't Peace; namely, planning, 
preparation, initiation or waging of a war of arpression 
or a war in violation of international treaties, agree­
ments or assurances, or participation in a common plan
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or conapirac/ for the accompllshmant of any of tha 
foregoing;
(b) >-.ar Crimea: namely, violations of the laws
or customs of war, Cuch violations shall include, but 
not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation 
to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian 
population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill- 
treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, 
killing of hostages, plunder of public or private 
property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or 
villages, or devastation not justified by military 
necessity;
(c) Crimea Against Humanity: namely, murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other 
inhumane acta comriitted against any civilian population, 
before or during the '̂ ar; or persécutions on political, 
racial or religious grounds inexécution of or in 
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of domestic 
law of the country where perpetrated.
Leaders, organisers, instigators and accomplices 
participating in Uie formulation or execution of a 
common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the fore­
going crimes are responsible for all acts performed by
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#ny person* in execution of such plan.
Article 7, The official position of defendants, whether 
a* Heads of 5tate or responsible officials in Government 
Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them 
from responsibility or mitigating punishment.
Article B. The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant 
to order of his Government or of a superior ^all not 
free him from responsibility, but may be considered in 
mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determine that 
justice so require*.
Article 9* At the trial of any individual member of 
any group or organisation the Tribunal may declare (in 
connection with any act of which the individual may be 
convicted) that the group or organisation of which the 
individual was a member was a crieou-nal organisation.
After receipt of the Indictment the Tribunal shall 
give such notice as it think* fit that the prosecution 
intend* to ask the Tribunal to make such declaration 
and any member of the organisation will be entitled to 
apply to the Tribunal for leave to be heard by the Tri­
bunal upon the question of the crimxnal character of the 
organisation. The Tribunal shall have power to allow or 
reject the application. If the application is allowed, 
the Tribunal may direct in what manner the applicants
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shall ha represented and heard*
Articla 10. In caaaa wham & group or organization is 
declared criminal b/ the Tribunal, tha co&petant 
national autorit/ of any Signatory shall have tha ri^ht 
to bring individuals to trial for membership therein 
before national, military or occupation courts* In any 
such case the criminal nature of the group or organisation 
is considered proved and shall not be questioned.
Article 11. Any person convicted by the Tribunal may be 
charged before a natxonal, military or occupation court, 
referred to in Article 10 of this Charter, with a crime 
other than of membership in a criminal group or organi­
sation and such court may, after convicting him, impose 
upon him punishment independent of and additional to the 
punishment imposed by the Tribunal for participation in 
the criminal a ctivities of such group or organisation.
Article 12. The Tribunal shall have the right to take 
proceedings against a person charged with crimes set 
out in Article 6 of this Charter in his absence, if he 
has not been found or if the Tribunal, for any reason, 
finds it necessary, in the interests of justice, to 
conduct the hearing in his absence.
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Articlt 13. Th# Tribunal ohall draw up rules for its 
procedure* These rules shall not be inconsistent with 
the provisions of this Charter*
111* Committee for the investigation and Prosecution of
Kajor *&r Criminals
Article 14* hach Signatory shall appoint a Chief Prosecu­
tor for the investigation of the charges bgalnst and the 
prosecution of major war criminals.
The Chief Prosecutors shall act as a committee for 
the following purposes:
(a) to agree upon a plan of the individual work 
of each of the Chief Prosecutors and his staff*
(b) to settle the final designation of major war 
criminals to be tried by the Tribunal*
(e) to approve the Indictment and the documents 
to be submitted therewith*
(d) to lodge the Indictment and the accompanying 
documents with the Tribunal*
(e) to draw up and recommend to the Tribunal for 
its approval draft rules of procedure* contemplated by 
Article 13 of this Charter* The Tribunal shall have 
power to accept* with or without amendments* or to 
reject* the rules so recommended*
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Th# Comilttf# shall act in all the : tove matters 
by a majority vote and shall appoint a Chairman as 
loay be convenient and in accordance with th# principle 
of rotation: provided that if there is an equal
division of vote concerning the designation of a 
Defendant to be tried by the Tribunal, or the crimes 
with which he shall be charged, that proposal will be 
adopted which was made by the party which proposed 
that the particular Defendant be tried, or the parti­
cular charges be preferred bgainat him.
Article 15* The Chief Fros^cutors shall individually, 
and acting in collaboration with one another, also 
undertake the following duties:
(a) investigation, collection and production 
before or at the Trial of all necessary evidence,
{b} the preparation of the Indictment for 
approval by the Committee in accordance with paragraph
(c) of Article 14 hereof,
(c) the preliminary examination of all necessary 
witnesses and of the Defendants,
(d) to act as prosecutor at the Trial,
(e) to appoint repre'tentatives to carry out 
such duties as may be assigned to them.
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(f) to unjortake such other mutter* as may 
appear necessary to them for the purposes of th# 
preparation for and conduct of the Trial.
It is understood that no witness or Defendant 
detained by any dlgnatory shall be taken out of the 
possession of that Signatory without its assent.
IV. Fair Trial for Defendants
Article 16. In order to ensure fair trial for the 
Defendants, the following procedure shall be followed:
(a) The Indictment shall include full parti­
culars specifying in detail the charges against the 
Defendants. A copy of the Indictment and of all the 
documents lodged with the indictment, translated
into a language which he understands, shall be furnished 
to the Defendant at a reasonable time before the Trial.
(b) During any preliminary examination or trial 
of a Defendant he shall have the ri&ht to give any 
explanation relevant to the charges made against him.
(o) A preliminary examination o. a Defendant 
and his Trial shall be conducted in, or translated 
into, a lan.]ua30 which the Defendant understands.
(d) À defendant shall have tha right to conduct 
his own defense before the Tribunal or to have the
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&8#l3tonoe of Counsol*
(#) A defendant ahaII have the rl;:ht through 
himself or throu^ his Counsel to present evidence 
At the Trial in support of his defense, and to 
cross-examine any witness called by the Prosecution*
V* Powers of the Tribunal and Conduct of the Trial
Article 17. The Tribunal shall have the power
(a) to summon witnesses to the Trial and to 
require their attendance and testimony and to put 
questions to them,
(b) to interrogate any Defendant,
(o) to require the production of documents and 
other evidentiary material,
(d) to administer oaths to witnesses,
(e) to appoint officers for the carrying out of 
any task designated by the Tribunal including tlie 
power to have evidence taken on commission*
Article Id* The Tribunal shall
(a) confine the Trial strictly to an expeditious 
hearing of the issues raised by the charges.
(b) take strict measures to prevent any action 
which will cause unreasonable delay, and rule out 
irrelevant issues and statements of any kind whatsoever,
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(c) leal auomrlly with any contumacy, imposing 
appropriate punishment, inclulin^ exclusion of any 
Defendant or his Counsel from some or all further 
proceedings, but without prejudice to tha determi­
nation of the charges*
Article 19. The tribunal s**hdll not be bound by techni­
cal rules of evidence* it shall adopt and apply to 
the gre&teot possible extent expeditious and non­
technical procedure, and shall udmit any cviiunce 
which it deems to have probative v^lue*
Article 20. The Tribunal may require to be informed of 
the nature of any evidence before it is offered so that 
it may rule upon the relevance thereof.
Article 21. The Tribunal shall not require proof of 
facts of common knowledge but shall take judicial 
notice thereof. It shall also take judicial notice of 
official ,ovcrnmental documents and reports of the 
United Nations, including the acts and documents of the 
coELsittees set up in the various allied countries for 
the investigation of war crimes, and the records and 
findings of military or other Tribunals of any of the 
United Katione.
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Article 22m The permanent aeat of the Tribunal shall 
be in Berlin* The first moetings of the membera of 
the Tribunal and of the Chief Froeecutore shall be 
held at Berlin in a place to be deaignated by the 
Control Council for Germany. The first trial shall 
be held at Kurnberg, and any aubae^uent trial* ohall 
be held at such places as the Tribunal may decide.
Article 23. One or more of the Chief Fros^cutors may 
tuko part in the prosecution at each Trial. The 
function of any Chief Prosecutor may be discharged 
by him personally, or by any person or persons 
authorised by him.
The function of Counsel for a Defendant may be 
discharged at the Defendant's request by any Counsel 
professionally qualified to conduct cases before the 
Courts of his own country, or by any other person who 
may be specially authorised thereto by the Tribunal.
Article 24. The proceedings at the Trial shall take 
the following course*
(a) The Indictment shall be read in court.
(b) The Tribunal shall ask each Defendant whether 
he pleads "guilty** or "not guilty."
(c) The prosecution shall make an opening state­
ment.
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(d) Th# Tribunal shall ask the prosecution and 
the defense what evidence (if any) they wish to aubruit 
to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal shall rule upon the 
admissibility of any such evidence.
(e) Tha witnesses for the Prosecution shall be 
examined and after that the witnesses for the Zefanae. 
Thereafter such rebutting evidence as may be held by 
the Tribunal to be admssible shall be called by 
either the Prosecution or the Defense.
(f) The Tribunal may put any question to any 
witness and to any Defendant, at any time.
(g) The Pros cution and the Defenae shall 
interrogate end may cross-examine any witnesses and 
any Defendant who gives tt-atimony.
(h} The Defense shall address the court.
(i) The Prosecution shall address the court.
(j) hach Defendant may make a statement to the 
Tribunal.
4k) The Tribunal sbtall deliver judgment and 
pronounce sentence.
Article 25. All official documents shall be produced, 
and all court proceedings conducted, in iZnrlish, French, 
and Russian, and in the language of the Defendant. 6o 
much of the record and of the proceedings nay also be
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tranalated Into the language of any country in which 
the Tribunal is sitting, as the Tribunal considers 
desirable in the interests of justice and public 
opinion.
71. Judgment and Sentence
Article 26. The judgment of the Tribunal as to the 
guilt or the innocence of any Defendant shall give the 
reasons on Wiich it is baaed, and shall be final and 
not subject to review.
Article 27. The Tribunal shall have the ri-ht to 
impose upon a Defendant on conviction, death or such 
other punishment as shall be determined by it to be 
just.
Article 26. In addition to any punishment imposed by 
it, the Tribunal shall have the right to deprive the 
convicted person of any stolen property and order its 
delivery to the Control Council for Germany.
Article 29* In case of guilt, sentences shall be 
carried out in accordance with the orders of the 
Control Council for Germany, which %ay at any time 
reduce or otherwise alter the sentences, but may not 
increase the severity thereof. If the Control Council
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for Germany, after any Defendant haa been convicted and 
sentenced, diücovers fresh evidence which, in its 
opinion, would found a fresh charge against him, the 
Council shall report accordingly to the Committee 
established under Article 14 hereof, for such action 
as they may consider proper, having regard to the 
interests of justice,
711, iixponsea
Article 30. The expens s of the Tribunal and of the 
Trials, shall be charged by the Signatories against 
the funds allotted for maintenance of the Control Council 
for Germany,
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